Essays in microeconomics with applications in education, health and crime by Westermaier, Franz
Essays in microeconomics
with applications in
education, health and crime
Franz Georg Westermaier
Dissertation submitted to the Hertie School of Governance
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.)
in the Doctoral Programme in Governance
Berlin, 2016
iFirst reviewer
Prof. Dr. Christian Traxler
Herite School of Governcance
& Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods (MPI Bonn)
Second reviewer
Prof. Dr. Peter Haan
Freie Universita¨t Berlin
& German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the supervision of Professor Christian
Traxler, who provided me with a perfect mix of instructive criticism and constant encourage-
ment. This thesis has gained substantially from his invaluable comments and suggestions.
During the past four years, I have also received a lot of support from my colleagues at
the Hertie School of Governance within internal seminars. Many thanks are also due to Felix
Albrecht, my colleague at the Philipps-University of Marburg, for fruitful and stimulating
discussions even beyond the scope of this thesis.
While preparing this thesis, I have benefited enormously from collaborations with Andrea
Mu¨hlenweg, Brant Morefield and Ansgar Wohlschlegel as well as my supervisor Christian
Traxler. It was – and continues to be – a pleasure to work with you!
Financial support from the Hertie Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Finally, I want to thank my parents Gerda and Fritz Westermaier, my siblings Carola and
Max Westermaier as well as my flatmates and friends Philipp Gu¨bler, Jane Lechler, Gianina
Meneses, Marcos Moreno, Mark Praznik, Irina Rogozhina, Isabel Urrutia and Margarita for
their support and tolerance during all these years.
Franz Georg Westermaier
Berlin, January 2016
Contents
Preface 1
1 Parental Health and Child Behavior:
Evidence from parental health shocks 4
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Data and Descriptive Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Empirical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 The Impact of Lengthening the School Day on Substance Abuse and
Crime:
Evidence from a German high school reform 28
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Literature Review and Institutional Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.2 German Education System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Contents iv
2.2.3 G8 Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2.4 Implications of the G8 Reform for Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.1 Police Crime Statistics (PKS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.2 Student Enrollment Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.3 Schulbus Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Identification and Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.5.1 Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.3 Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3 Bunching on the Autobahn:
Speeding responses to a ‘notched’ penalty scheme 58
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Survey Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4.1 Responses to Notches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.2 Responses to the Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Contents v
3.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.6.1 Descriptive Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.6.2 Estimation Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6.3 Bunching Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.6.4 Responses to the Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.7 Concluding Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Bibliography 96
Curriculum Vitae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
List of Tables
1.1 Parental health satisfaction and child behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Impact of health shocks on child behavior (age 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Impact of health shocks on adaptive behavior and robustness checks
(age 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Robustness checks including household control variables . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Items of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) . . . . . . 25
1.6 Items of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (VAB), SOEP-version . 26
1.7 Means (standard deviations) of control variables included in the main
regression analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1 Implementation timetable of the G8 reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 Reform dummy impact on different crime rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 G8 reform impact on different crime rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Age group specific G8 reform impact on drug-related crimes . . . . . . 46
2.5 G8 reform impact on cannabis dealing and consuming rate . . . . . . . 48
2.6 G8 reform impact on cannabis using in school within the last year . . . 51
2.7 G8 reform impact on cannabis addiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Contents vii
2.8 G8 reform impact on cannabis prevalence in peer-group . . . . . . . . . 53
2.9 G8 reform impact on cannabis prevalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.10 G8 reform impact on former students’ crime rate . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 Penalties for speeding at German Autobahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Summary statistics – survey data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 Summary statistics – speeding tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Bunching estimates for different cutoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5 Propensity score matching of pre- and post-reform speeding Levels . . . 83
3.6 Fraction of speeders relative to all measured cars . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.7 Impact of reform on bunching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
List of Figures
2.1 Relative share of students in the G8 track relative to all Gymnasium
students (G8 and G9 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1 Expected and actual fines (in Euro) for a given speed above the limit. 65
3.2 Optimal speed level with notches: Interior optimum and corner solution 68
3.3 Bunching at notch xi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Density distribution of speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Empirical and counterfactual distribution of speeding levels . . . . . . . 80
3.6 Pre- and post-reform distribution of penalty-relevant speeding levels . 90
3.7 Empirical and counterfactual distribution of speeding levels: Pre- and
post-reform period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.8 Expectations regarding the cutoff points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.9 Expected tolerance rule deductions (in percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Preface 1
Preface
I herewith present my dissertation in the field of microeconomics, which demonstrates
my ability to carry out advanced independent scientific work and provides an advance-
ment of scientific knowledge in this and related fields. Simple changes in an institutional
framework can have huge impacts for the human society which makes it important to
analyze them and define their consequences to create a surplus for the society.
In the following dissertation, I present applications how policy regulations and
external events generate behavioral responses with a focus on indirect effects, e.g.
from health on education and education on crime. All chapters, while not exclusively,
follow an empirical approach and show effects in important fields of human society.
Beyond the research methods from microeconomics, this dissertation tackles the field of
health, early childhood development, secondary education, adolescent drug-abuse and
law enforcement. Several identification strategies are used to cope with endogeneity
and deliver causal effects between the fields of education, health and crime.
Every chapter of this dissertation evaluates institutional changes on behavioral
responses in different stages of life: early-childhood, adolescence and adulthood.
Chapter 1 focuses on early-childhood and relies on exogenous changes of the family’s
constraints affecting the most important institution for a young child, her family.
Chapter 2 analyzes an educational reform effect on adolescents’ behavior in substance
abuse and crime. Chapter 3 makes use of the design of an institutional framework
itself to analyze how human behavior is affected by it.
Chapter 1 examines the importance of parental health in the development of child
behavior during early childhood.1 With respect to the formation of children’s cognitive
and non-cognitive skills, the early childhood is a crucial stage of skill development since
it is the foundation for all other skills that are achieved later on in life. Furthermore,
the family or specifically changes in family’s budget constraints are important because
they account for most of the environment which is influencing children in their early
childhood.
This analysis is based on child psychometric measures from a longitudinal German
dataset, which tracks mothers and their newborns up to age six. We identify major
changes in parental health (shocks) and control for a variety of initial characteristics of
1This chapter is co-authored with Andrea M. Mu¨hlenweg and Brant Morefield.
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the child including prenatal conditions. The results are robust to placebo regressions
of health shocks that occur after the outcomes are measured. Furthermore, we can
rule out that the measured effects of parental health shocks are driven by other serious
events like divorce, job-losses etc.. While these events might exert additional effects
on children’s non-cognitive skills they are not biasing our main results. Our findings
point to negative effects of maternal health shocks on children’s emotional symptoms,
conduct problems and hyperactivity. We estimate that maternal health shocks worsen
outcomes by as much as 0.9 standard deviations. In contrast, paternal health seems
to be less relevant to children’s behavioral skills.
Chapter 2 focuses on how student’s behavior in crime and illegal substance abuse
can be affected by an educational reform. Adolescent students are in their crucial stage
to gain drug experiences or engage in criminal activity. In contrast to the previous
literature which focuses on high-risk groups with respect to crime, the analyzed reform
affected high performing students in education with higher opportunity costs to engage
in crime.
During the last decade, a major educational reform in Germany reduced the aca-
demic high school duration by one year while keeping constant the total number of
instructional hours before graduation. The instructional hours from the eliminated
school year shifted to lower grade levels, which increased the time younger students
spend at school. This study explores the impact of the reform on youth crime rates
and substance abuse using administrative police crime statistics, administrative stu-
dent enrollment data, and a student drug survey.
The staggered implementation of the reform in different La¨nder -age-groups allows
for a difference-in-difference approach. I find that the reform resulted in a decline in
crime rates, which is almost exclusively driven by a reduction in violent crime and
illegal substance abuse. Regarding the latter, the rate of illegal cannabis consumption
strongly declined; however, no significant effect is detected on cannabis dealers or the
consumption of other illegal drugs.
Declining cannabis addiction of reform-affected students is also documented in a
repeated student drug survey. The survey evidence further suggests that decreased
cannabis consumption was not driven by a shift of consumption into ‘school hours’.
The results point to an ‘incapacitation’ effect of schooling due to the intensified cur-
riculum at lower grade levels: The extent to which the effect is driven by incapacitation
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in school classrooms or ‘self-incapacitation’ at home to cope with the higher study
workload remains unclear.
Chapter 3 analyzes the reaction of adult behavior within a penalty scheme for speed-
ing.2 In comparison to the first two chapters which are focusing on effects in the long-
or medium- run, the last chapter studies responses to an institutional setting where
the individual decision making process is performed in a really short time horizon.
The paper studies drivers’ responses to a ‘notched’ penalty scheme in which speeding
penalties are stepwise increasing with discontinuous jumps at several speed levels.
We first present survey evidence suggesting that drivers in Germany are very well
aware of the notched penalty structure. Based on a simple analytical framework we
then analyze the impact of the notches on drivers’ optimal speed choices. The model’s
predictions are then confronted with data on more than 150,000 speeding tickets from
violations occurring on the German Autobahn.
The data provide evidence on bunching: many drivers who speed still stay below a
penalty notch. For major speed limit violations, however, we do not detect bunching.
The paper further explores the impact of a recent policy reform and discusses the
normative implications of our findings. The results from our positive analysis also
carry implications for the normative debate on optimal speed limit enforcement and
optimal penalties in general.
All chapters of this dissertation show impacts of different institutional settings
which shape human’s behavior in different stages of their lifetime. While the first two
chapters focus on major changes in institutions of young children and adolescents, the
third chapter shows that even small details of an institutional design can have a huge
impact on the design-making process of (boundedly) rational adults.
2This chapter is co-authored with Christian Traxler and Ansgar Wohlschlegel.
Chapter 1
Parental Health and Child
Behavior:
Evidence from parental health
shocks
Co-authored with Andrea M. Mu¨hlenweg & Brant Morefield
1.1 Introduction
This study examines the importance of parental health in the development of chil-
dren’s non-cognitive skills during early childhood. We draw on standard psychometric
measures in young children, covering emotional symptoms, conduct problems, hyper-
activity, and peer-relationship problems. For simplicity, we refer to these items as
behavioral skills. To our knowledge, there is limited evidence regarding parental health
effects on the development of child behavioral skills to date. At the same time, these
respective skills are known to be important components of human capital, yielding
improved education and labor market outcomes (e.g. Cunha and Heckman 2008).
From a theoretical point of view, one would expect that poor parental health affects
a family’s budget constraints altering parental investment in children’s skills. For
instance, a less healthy adult may face tighter budget constraints because she is forced
to spend down family wealth (Wu 2003), is less productive in performing chores or
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in the labor market (Podor and Halliday 2012) and earns a lower income (Currie and
Madrian 1999).1 Poor parental health may also reduce both the productivity and
the amount of time parents spend with their children (cf. Ruhm 2004 and Morefield
2010 for empirical evidence). Additionally, poor parental health may have a direct
impact as it can traumatize or even stigmatize children (Coneus et al. 2012). In any
case, the nature of the technology of skill formation suggests potentially long-lasting
effects from even temporary reductions in investment in skill development (Cunha et
al. 2006). For instance, skill formation includes sensitive periods, wherein investments
are more productive, and remediation of reduced investment during these periods is
more costly in later periods. As such, we may expect differing investment periods to
exert different impacts; our study distinguishes between parental health in two periods
of early childhood, these being from ages 0 to 3 and from ages 3 to 6.
The identification of parental health effects on child outcomes is challenged by the
fact that parental health may be endogenous to the formation of children’s skills. For
example, genetic dispositions for specific (mental) health conditions may affect both
parental health and children’s psychopathological outcomes. In addition, small, but
permanent, depreciations in the parental health status evolving over time could be
a result of individual decisions such as deleterious living conditions, which may also
affect investments in children’s skills. Therefore, we use sudden changes (shocks) in
parental health instead of current health status as an identifying source of variation.
We assume that a sudden drop in health is less likely to be determined by the indi-
vidual’s decision making process and, therefore, more exogenous. Similarly, we expect
genetically pre-determined health conditions to exert more permanent health effects
over time. In contrast, potential reasons for major period-to-period shocks in observed
health measures are accidents or the (unexpected) onset of a physical handicap of dis-
ease (cf. Riphan 1999). However, we cannot rule out that there are cases where a
sudden onset of a severe health condition will be unexpected and endogenous in the
sense of our identification strategy. Therefore, we additionally control for a variety
of mother and child variables, including prenatal (health) conditions and also include
current household events such as family disruption or job loss in a robustness check.
Our shock-based approach corresponds to a common strategy used to identify effects
of health on socio-economic measures (e.g. Smith 1999; Smith 2005; Riphan 1999;
Jones et al. 2010). To test the identifying assumption of our model, we present several
1Adda et al. (2009), Riphahn (1999) and Smith (2004) provide further evidence on income changes
due to health shocks.
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robustness checks including results from placebo regressions where we regress child
outcomes on future parental health shocks.2
This paper follows recent empirical studies that demonstrate the importance of
early life events on human capital development. While the general importance of home
investments during the early part of a child’s life has been shown (e.g. Todd and
Wolpin 2007; Blomeyer et al. 2009 based on German data), attempts to quantify the
effects of commonly experienced household shocks are limited. A related strand of lit-
erature examines the effects of changes in family structure on children’s outcomes (cf.
Ribar 2004 for a review with a focus on marriage). Additional studies on changes in
family background and child outcomes consider parental employment and life satisfac-
tion. For Germany, Berger et al. (2010) show that permanent maternal unemployment
negatively affects children’s adaptive behavior. Berger and Spieß (2011) provide ev-
idence on the positive impacts of maternal life satisfaction on children’s verbal and
socio-emotional skills.3
Besides this literature, there are few papers in the economics literature that seek
to identify the causal effects of parental health on child outcomes with a focus mainly
on child educational outcomes:4
Johnson and Reynolds (2013) analyze the effects of household members’ hospitaliza-
tion on the educational attainment of adolescents. Controlling for pre-hospitalization
background, they find negative effects of hospitalizations lasting one week or longer.
Other household members’ hospitalizations impact the probability of children complet-
ing high school, attending college and receiving a university degree. Negative effects are
2Note that our research question differs from the literature on the in-utero influences of maternal
health on child outcomes (cf. Currie and Almond 2011 for a review). We are interested in how
child behavior is affected by variations in parental health in the early years of childhood (after birth).
Therefore, initial maternal and child health (at birth) are used as control variables in our empirical
approach.
3See Currie and Almond (2011) for an international review of further studies. In addition, studies
on parental death might be considered as the most extreme health shock (cf. Adda et al. 2011 for a
recent paper and a review of the evidence). They find small negative effects on skill development and
somewhat lower earnings later in life for the affected children. Based on a difference-in-differences
approach, Senne (2014) provides strong evidence that adult mortality has short- and long-run negative
impacts on children’s educational outcomes.
4Our work also relates to studies that examine the impact of maternal psychiatric illness, the
most common of which are depression or substance abuse and smoking during pregnancy, on children’s
outcomes. The results consistently show that children of depressed mothers fare worse on a wide range
of outcomes, including the development of cognitive and motor skills (Petterson and Albers 2001),
problem behavior (Frank and Meara 2009), and social behavior (Kim-Cohen et al. 2005). Farahati et
al. (2003) find that parental psychiatric illness is associated with a lower probability of high school
graduation among children. Balsa (2008) provides evidence that parental problem drinking exerts
negative impacts on children’s labor market performance later in life.
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more pronounced for male adolescents, and there are differential effects by the birth or-
der and gender of older siblings. Andrews and Logan (2010) examine whether parental
health status accounts for test-score gaps between school-age children of different eth-
nicities. The authors find that controlling for a large set of parental health measures
reduces the test-score gap between Blacks and Whites (Hispanic and Whites) by 17
percent (10 percent). Sun and Yao (2010) draw on a panel of rural Chinese households
to analyze how parental health shocks impact school-aged children’s educational at-
tainment. According to their findings, parental health shocks negatively affect younger
children’s outcomes, while there is no measurable impact on students in secondary
school. The study suggests that the educational effects are mainly due to limited
financial resources.
While this previous literature focuses on educational outcomes and cognitive skills,
there is little evidence on parental health effects on behavioral outcomes. More-
field (2010) is most closely related to our work. Besides cognitive (mathematical) skills,
the study examines a measure of children’s problem behavior which is similar to the
aggregated psychometric measure we use in our analysis. The paper analyzes whether
the onset of parental health conditions relates to an increase in children’s problem be-
havior. In contrast to our study, Morefield (2010) does not consider parental health
shocks but the reported onset of specific health conditions limiting parents’ usual daily
activities. The study finds that these health conditions at ages 5-9 are related to signif-
icant increases in children’s problem behaviors but not at younger or older ages (up to
age 18). And, there are no significant effects on the children’s cognitive skill measure.
Beyond the evidence for an aggregated psychometric measure, our study provides
detailed results for a battery of behavioral skills. Our findings show significant negative
effects of maternal health shocks on the aggregated behavioral score and on children’s
emotional symptoms, conduct problems, and hyperactivity. We do not find such effects
in “placebo regressions” where we estimate the impact of parental health shocks that
occur after a score for non-cognitive skills in early childhood is measured. The results
are also robust to controlling for additional household events that may drive a spurious
relationship (i.e. job loss, family disruption, and income loss). While an examination
of the mechanisms that link parental health and child outcomes is beyond the scope of
this paper, an additional analysis that includes family income suggests that financial
investments in children’s skills development are not the main drivers of the observed
effects. This is consistent with previous research on household income on children’s
outcomes, which implies that quality or quantity of parental time are more important
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than financial resources (e.g. Propper et al. 2007; Violato et al. 2011; Dooley and
Stewart 2007).
To our knowledge, the current study is the first that examines parental health
shocks and children’s skills outcomes based on German data. Germany differs from
the US in many institutional aspects that may be relevant to the translation of parental
health problems to child behavior effects. For example, the availability and level of
paid sick leave policies are much more generous in Germany and assure that employees
receive financial coverage for longer periods requiring time off from work (cf. Heymann
et al. 2009 for an international comparison).5 Therefore, one might assume that tighter
budget constraints due to parental illness will be a less severe problem in Germany
compared to the US. Similarly, parental leave and parental benefit regulations are
relatively generous in Germany. Parental leave predominantly taken by mothers is
generally guaranteed for three years, prolonging to six years if a second child is born.
In line with a predominant male breadwinner model, most of the employed German
mothers work part time to have more time for child-rearing activities (cf. Ciccia and
Verloo 2012). As a stylized fact, according to OECD figures, the share of families
with two full-time working parents amounts to less than 20 percent in German two-
parent families with children under age 14; this proportion is roughly 70 percent for
comparable families in the US (OECD 2012).
These stylized differences with German mothers predominantly taking the role of
children’s caregivers and the breadwinner’s health being less important with respect
to sustaining family income may point to a potentially higher importance of maternal
health in Germany as compared to the US. Our empirical analyses distinguish between
maternal and paternal health shocks and find that maternal health shocks are especially
harmful. This result differs from evidence in the above mentioned study by Morefield
(2010) based on US data. Morefield (2010) fails to identify statistically significant
impacts of maternal health conditions on child outcomes while there is evidence that
paternal health conditions negatively impact child behavior. However, the author notes
the low precision of estimates conditional on parent’s gender due to a small sample
5Heymann et al. (2009) systematically assess paid-sick-pay and paid-sick leave policies in 22
countries. While the US ranks worst, Germany is ranked as one of the top five countries (based on
coverage for full-time equivalent working-days for median earners). In general, sick-pay in Germany
amounts to 100 percent of an employee’s previous salary for up to six weeks. After this period, the
public health insurance companies cover about 70 percent of the individual’s regular gross income for
up to 78 weeks within each three year period.
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size (cf. the Conclusion section of Morefield 2010).6 For the aggregated results not
conditioned on parent’s gender our findings are in line with Morefield (2010): In both
studies, parental health events are especially harmful in the observed age groups that
include school entry age (here: age 3-6, Morefield: age 5-9).7
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the data
used and provides descriptive evidence. Section 1.3 discusses our empirical approach.
Section 1.4 presents and discusses our findings together with evidence from several
robustness checks. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Our empirical analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).8
The SOEP is a representative panel study that records annual information on approx-
imately 20,000 adults that live in approximately 12,000 households. While several
indicators of health are collected over time in the SOEP, the most consistently fielded
health-related question gathers self-reported health satisfaction − coded from zero
(completely dissatisfied) to ten (completely satisfied). In addition, as a more objective
measure, we use yearly information on the number of nights spent in hospital.9
In 2003, the SOEP began collecting the so-called “mother-and-child data” which we
use for our study. The database contains information on newborn children (i.e. younger
than 1.5 years) and their mothers. Further information on the children is collected when
6Because of different samples and estimation strategies, our findings are not directly comparable
to Morefield (2010). Particularly, Morefield (2010) considers a sample of all children up to age 18
when comparing paternal and maternal health events. This analysis does not differentiate between
age groups while our results relate to young children up to age three and from age three to age six
respectively. Morefield (2010) examines changes in age-adjusted measures conditional on the reported
onsets of specific diagnoses and parental health limitations instead of health shocks while controlling
for parental and child background variables including children’s home learning environment.
7Ermisch et al. (2012) use the same data and aggregated behavioral measure as in our paper.
They find that multiple maternal relationship changes (due to separations or new partners) are related
to an increase in the aggregated measure by about 0.4 standard deviations for children observed when
they are about six years old. In terms of magnitude this also corresponds to the size of the estimated
parental health effects on the aggregated outcome for children aged 3-6 in our study.
8Cf. Wagner et al. (2007) for an overview and introduction to the dataset.
9Further SOEP health questions include health limitations, handicaps, chronic diseases, health
deteriorations, days of sick leave, current state of health, number of hospital visits, medical care
after work accidents, and any doctor’s visits in the previous three months. However, the respective
information is only collected biannually, conditional on employment and/or covers limited periods of
time. In sum, these measures are not appropriate for our estimation strategy, which relies on year-
to-year changes in health measures. In addition, the sample size does not allow for differentiating the
specific health conditions that underlie the observed health shocks.
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they are about three years old (23 years) and again when they are about six years old
(56 years). One feature of the mother-and-child data is the measurement of children’s
non-cognitive outcomes. We use a modified version of the Strength and Difficulties
Questionnaire (SDQ) measured when the children are approximately six years old.
The SDQ is a standard psychometric measure and is based on mothers’ assessments of
their children’s behavior and socio-emotional skills (Goodman 1997) and is commonly
used in psychopathological screening (e.g. Becker et al. 2006; Achenbach et al. 2008).
We show results for two aggregated measures derived from the SDQ: children’s socio-
emotional behavior (SEB) and the pro-social behavior score (PBS).
The SEB indexes four dimensions of non-cognitive skills, for which we provide
detailed evidence, including emotional symptoms, conduct problems, hyperactivity and
inattention, and peer-relationship problems.
The PBS is based on maternal judgment of children’s thoughtfulness, cooperation,
and helpfulness.10 For ease of interpretation, we have altered the measures so that
lower scores consistently represent worsened behavioral outcomes and are standardized
(z-scores).
In addition to the SDQ, one additional skill measure is used for our robustness
checks: the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (VAB) which we observe for the sample
of three-year-olds. The VAB is an index of children’s non-cognitive skills based on
parental reports of children’s verbal skills, activities of daily living, motor skills, and
social skills.11 We use the VAB to estimate a “placebo regression” wherein we estimate
the effects of parental health shocks that occur both prior to and after the VAB is
collected. Under the identifying assumption, health shocks that occur after the VAB
is collected should not be correlated with child scores in our model.
The SOEP includes data on 703 children from birth to age six. We exclude individu-
als with missing information on the mother’s age when she delivered (23 observations),
the week of gestation at the time of the child’s birth (15), and child’s birth weight
(2). Of the remaining 663 children, we observe the SDQ (VAB) outcome for 639 (634)
children.
10Table 1.5 in the Appendix provides the detailed questions underlying all the SDQ items.
11Table 1.6 in the Appendix lists all questions to gather the VAB score. However, we do not present
more detail on the Vineland Scale since it is solely used to conduct a robustness check. The interested
reader is referred to Schmiade et al. (2008) who summarize the use of the Vineland Scale as a measure
of child development in the SOEP.
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Table 1.1 provides the mean values of the children’s skill measures (column 1) and
means conditional on the parents’ self-rated health satisfaction. Approximately 20
percent of parents are in “bad health” when their child is six years old, where “bad
health” is defined as values from 0 to 5 on the eleven-point scale and “good health”
values range from 6 to 10. Table 1.1 implies that children of healthier mothers have
more favorable socio-emotional outcomes. The mean difficulty score is about 0.4 stan-
dard deviations higher for children whose mothers are in good health. Looking at the
SDQ sub-scales suggests that having a less healthy mother is significantly related to
a poorer emotional symptom score, a higher incidence of hyperactivity and conduct
problems, and less favorable pro-social behavior. The means do not indicate significant
differences in child behavior in relation to paternal health.12 All SDQ scores imply less
favorable outcomes for households without a father, but the difference is not statisti-
cally significant. We treat the mother’s partner living in the household as a father.
According to this definition, 21 percent of the sampled children are in single mother
households.
12Table 1.1 also includes the mean Vineland scores that inform on children’s adaptive behavior at
age three. None of the observed differences are statistically significant conditional on parental health
at age three (not shown) or age six (included in Table 1.1).
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1.3 Empirical Approach
The descriptive information in Table 1.1 shows less favorable non-cognitive outcomes
for children whose parents suffer from bad health. However, this may be due to unob-
served characteristics driving parental as well as child outcomes. Parents’ and children’s
human capital are likely to be interrelated genetically and environmentally. For ex-
ample a genetic disposition for a specific mental-health limitation might go along with
a less favorable development of cognitive or behavioral skills. Therefore, in order to
estimate the effects of parental health in the early years of a child’s life, we examine
parental health shocks instead of health levels. We define health shocks as sizeable
year-to-year changes in an individual’s self-reported health satisfaction or in the num-
ber of nights she spent in a hospital during the year. More specifically, we define a
shock in health satisfaction as a year-to-year drop in health satisfaction of two or more
standard deviations and a shock in hospitalization as a year-to-year increase of one
or more standard deviations in the number of nights in hospital.13 In our data, one
standard deviation of the health-satisfaction distribution corresponds to two points on
the eleven-point (zero-to-ten) scale for mothers and fathers.14 Thus, a shock is defined
as a drop of four or more points from one year to the following year. For nights spent in
hospital, one standard deviation corresponds to six nights during the year for mothers
and four nights for fathers; shocks are defined as increases of six or four nights per year
for mothers and fathers, respectively.
Based on the two health measures and on combinations of them, we create four
alternative shock definitions: (1) a shock in health satisfaction or in nights of hospi-
13We opt for the more generous definition of a hospitalization shock in order to obtain a reasonable
number of shock observations in our sample. If we used the two standard deviation threshold for
hospital-defined health shocks as well, we would observe very few cases of maternal (18 cases) and
paternal (14 cases) health shocks for children aged 3-6. Our definition of a shock in health satisfaction
is similar to and only slightly less stringent than that used by Riphahn (1999), which is a drop by
at least five points for older workers. Our results do not substantially change if we use the two
standard deviation threshold for hospitalization shocks. These results are available upon request
from the authors. Also note that maternal hospitalization shocks imply a duration exceeding the
usual hospitalization periods around childbirth. According to Schneider (2008), German childbearing
mothers spend on average 2.8 days in hospital.
14The definition of a shock necessitates that a parent starts the observation period with a health
satisfaction rating that allows for a drop of four points. In our sample, only five percent of parents
report health satisfaction scores below the minimum threshold for a shock (satisfaction≤ 3). Removing
these low-health-satisfaction respondents from our sample does not alter our results.
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talization; (2) a shock in health satisfaction; (3) a shock in nights of hospitalization;
and (4) a shock in both health satisfaction and nights of hospitalization.15
We assume that shocks are often due to exogenous sources of variation. Ideally,
we would also observe the reason for a health shock (e.g. accidents) and only draw
on such changes that are least likely to suffer from an omitted-variable bias. However,
distinguishing specific health events is not possible since the underlying dataset offers
only limited information on symptoms rather than on specific illnesses. Therefore, we
use a rather broad health shock definition but additionally control for the initial health
of children (at birth) and of their parents (before childbirth). In further specifications,
to take general living conditions into account, we also include household characteristics
such as household income and parental employment.
Similar shock-based approaches have previously been used in the empirical litera-
ture on health effects. For example, Hagan et al. (2009) apply this approach to study
health and retirement in Europe. Riphahn (1999) examines impacts of health shocks
on income and employment. Both studies define health shocks as standard deviation-
based changes in the health variable. As noted above, we use a similar definition for
shocks.
Assuming that our observed health shocks are exogenous, conditional on initial
health and other covariates, we estimate the following reduced-form specification:
Yi = α + β1MHS
0−3
i + β2MHS
3−6
i + γ1PHS
0−3
i + γ2PHS
3−6
i +Xiδ1 + Ciδ2 + i (1)
Child behavioral skill Yi is derived from the child’s SDQ score at age six. The
maternal health shock (MHS) and paternal health shock (PHS) variables distinguish
whether the specific parent was subject to a health shock before or after the child is
three years of age, as noted by the superscripts 0-3 and 3-6. All of our regressions
control for variables that are considered to be related to the children’s initial skills
endowment: The vector Xi includes child’s gender, birth order, week of gestation at
birth, birth weight, a second-order polynomial of the age of the mother at the birth
(measured in months), and a second-order polynomial of the age of the child (mea-
15We observe that roughly 30 percent of mothers who experience a negative change of more than
two standard deviations in health satisfaction experienced a corresponding shock, defined by the
number of nights spent in hospital, early in children’s lives.
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sured in months), allowing for a flexible age effect.16 The vector Ci captures parental
education, immigration background, prenatal household income, parental initial health
satisfaction, and the initial number of nights of parental hospitalization (all variables
were observed one year before the child’s birth).17 Table 1.7 in the appendix lists the
control variables along with their means and standard deviations.
The numbers of health shocks observed in our data are provided in Tables 1.2 and
1.3 together with the results for each of the four definitions of a health shock. Generally,
maternal health shocks occur more frequently than paternal health shocks in the data.18
Since there are few paternal health shocks according to our strictest specification (4),
we note that the results of this specification are subject to large standard errors.
1.4 Results
Table 1.2 shows the estimated impacts of parental health shocks on children’s be-
havioral skills. For each of the observed outcomes (Panels A to F), we estimate the
four specifications according to our definitions of parental health shocks. As indicated
above, specification (1) uses the broadest definition of a shock, while specification (4)
implies the most restrictive definition. The bottom panel of Table 1.2 provides the
respective numbers of health shock observations.
In the following, we first discuss the results for maternal health shocks with a
focus on statistically significant estimates. Since fewer estimated effects from paternal
16We use an indicator for firstborn children to take birth order into account. As an alternative
to the birth-weight specification, we tested specifications that included a high-birth-weight dummy
variable (2.5 kilogram or more). The results are robust if we use this specification.
17We control for parental education based on a tertiary education indicator taking the value of one
if at least one parent obtained a university degree or a comparable level of (vocational) education. The
definition corresponds to a level of 5 or higher according to the UNESCO’s International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED 1997), where ISCED level 5 is defined as the “first stage of tertiary
education (not leading directly to an advanced research qualification)” (UNESCO, 2006, p. 19). To
control for migration background we use an indicator variable taking the value of one if at least one
parent holds a non-German nationality. This is true for 16 percent of individuals in our sample, mostly
with Turkish (40 percent) and Italian (13 percent) nationality. We also include indicator variables for
missing parental information, which take into account that there are single-headed households.
18This is also the case in previous studies on parental health effects (e.g. Morefield 2010) and in
line with evidence that women in the relevant age group have more episodes of hospitalization than
men (cf. Case and Paxson 2005). However, part of the difference reflected in our numbers is due to the
fact that there are households headed by single mothers in our sample. According to Table 1.1, about
21 percent of children are growing up without a father. All specifications consider both maternal
and paternal health shocks, while we include an indicator variable for households headed by single
mothers.
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health shocks are statistically significant from zero, these will be addressed in a separate
paragraph below.
The regression results for the overall difficulty score suggest that maternal health
shocks occurring in the second period of observation – when children are aged 3 to 6
– significantly affect child behavior. The estimates are robust among all specifications
and range from 0.4 to 0.9 standard deviations, with the largest effect corresponding to
the most stringent measure of a health shock (Panel A of Table 1.2).
Panels B to E of Table 1.2 provide evidence on each of the specific behavioral dimen-
sions. For specifications (2) and (4), maternal health shocks occurring when children
are aged 0-3 are negatively related to the emotional symptom score. The estimated
impact varies from 0.2 (specification 2) to 0.4 standard deviations (specification 4).
However, the estimate is not robust when shocks are defined by hospitalizations (spec-
ifications 1 and 3). In contrast, second period maternal health shocks more consistently
exert a negative impact of about one half of a standard deviation: Again, we see the
strongest impact when looking at the most restrictive health-shock definition (0.6 stan-
dard deviations).
For second period maternal health shocks, we also observe negative impacts of
about 0.2 standard deviations on the child hyperactivity score (Panel C). However,
the respective estimates are not statistically significant from zero in specifications (3)
and (4), due to low power from a smaller number of observed health shocks. Simi-
larly, second period maternal health shocks seem to be related to a higher incidence
of children’s conduct problems (Panel D). The size of the estimated effect is about
0.2 standard deviations (not statistically significant in specification (3), with a larger
impact of 0.9 standard deviations for specification (4).
Maternal health shocks are not robustly related to child peer relationship prob-
lems (Panel E). Although all of the point estimates suggest a higher incidence of peer
relationship problems for second period maternal health shocks, this result is only sta-
tistically significant in specification (2), where the estimate amounts to 0.2 standard
deviations. And, in contrast, the signs of the point estimates for earlier maternal health
shocks are not consistently positive or negative in specifications (1) to (4), with a pos-
itive and statistically significant estimated impact of about 0.2 standard deviations
when based on hospitalization shocks (specifications 1 and 3). We do not observe any
significant impact of parental health shocks on children’s pro-social behavior (Panel F).
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Table 1.2: Impact of health shocks on child behavior (age 6)
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
any shock shock in shock in shock in
health hospitali- satisfaction
satisfaction zation & hospitali-
(2 s.d.) (1 s.d.) zation
(A) Overall difficulty score, SEB (R)
Mother 0.01 -0.17 0.06 -0.23
(age 0-3) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.24)
Father 0.06 0.45∗∗∗ -0.15 0.23
(age 0-3) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.43)
Mother -0.41∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗ -0.95∗
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.51)
Father -0.01 0.12 -0.23 -0.19
(age 3-6) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.32)
(B) Emotional Symptoms (R)
Mother -0.04 -0.21∗ 0.01 -0.37∗
(age 0-3) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.23)
Father -0.00 0.19 -0.06 0.46
(age 0-3) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16) (0.29)
Mother -0.47∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗
(age 3-6) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.29)
Father 0.11 -0.25∗ -0.07 0.27
(age 3-6) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.21)
(C) Hyperactivity (R)
Mother -0.11 -0.18 -0.07 -0.15
(age 0-3) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.25)
Father 0.07 0.38∗∗ -0.13 -0.24
(age 0-3) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.50)
Mother -0.21∗∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.17 -0.82
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.51)
Father -0.07 -0.02 -0.20 -0.48
(age 3-6) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.36)
Observations 639 639 639 639
# maternal shocks (age 0-3) 183 78 126 21
# paternal shocks (age 0-3) 74 30 48 4
# maternal shocks (age 3-6) 138 85 61 8
# paternal shocks (age 3-6) 86 54 39 7
Continued on next page...
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... table 1.2 continued
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
any shock shock in shock in shock in
health hospitali- satisfaction
satisfaction zation & hospitali-
(2 s.d.) (1 s.d.) zation
(D) Conduct Problems (R)
Mother 0.04 -0.05 0.06 0.06
(age 0-3) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.22)
Father 0.05 0.52∗∗∗ -0.20 0.52
(age 0-3) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.36)
Mother -0.20∗∗ -0.22∗ -0.22 -0.85∗∗
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.43)
Father -0.06 0.03 -0.20 -0.35
(age 3-6) (0.12) (0.15) (0.18) (0.51)
(E) Peer relationship problems (R)
Mother -0.19∗∗ -0.00 0.21∗ -0.16
(age 0-3) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.27)
Father 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.42
(age 0-3) (0.13) (0.22) (0.15) (0.58)
Mother -0.16 -0.23∗∗ -0.02 -0.12
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.36)
Father -0.04 0.04 -0.16 0.03
(age 3-6) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.23)
(F) Pro-social behavior, PBS
Mother 0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.10
(age 0-3) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.22)
Father -0.09 0.06 -0.21 -0.56
(age 0-3) (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.57)
Mother 0.01 -0.08 0.09 -0.20
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.38)
Father 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.33
(age 3-6) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.29)
Observations 639 639 639 639
# maternal shocks (age 0-3) 183 78 126 21
# paternal shocks (age 0-3) 74 30 48 4
# maternal shocks (age 3-6) 138 85 61 8
# paternal shocks (age 3-6) 86 54 39 7
Notes: Coefficients (robust standard errors) from regressions using the SOEP, version 28.
Regressions control for parental initial health satisfaction and hospitalization, education and
immigrant background, household income before giving birth, children’s gender, birth order,
gestation week of pregnancy at birth date, birth weight, a second-order polynomial of the age of the
mother at childbirth and a second-order polynomial of the children’s age at the time of observation.
Outcome variables are standardized test scores (z-score). Higher scores imply more favorable
behavioral skills (R = reverse scale). ∗ Statistically significant at the ten percent level of
significance, ∗∗ at the five percent level and ∗∗∗ at the one percent level. s.d. = standard deviation.
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For all of the outcomes, we fail to find evidence for negative impacts of paternal
health shocks. However, for specification (2), we obtain statistically significant pos-
itive coefficients of early paternal health shocks in panels A, C (conduct problems)
and D (hyperactivity), suggesting improvement after a parental health shock. We do
not observe such a positive impact related to shocks defined by changes in hospitaliza-
tions.19 However, the positive point estimates are rather high, suggesting that there
might be a direct positive effect of paternal health problems (not related to hospital-
ization) on children’s hyperactivity (0.4 standard deviations) and conduct problems
(0.5 standard deviations). One explanation for the positive estimated impacts may be
that sick fathers shift market time towards time with children, contributing positively
to children’s skill development.20 The increase in paternal time investments may be
more beneficial for children’s skill development than a reduction in goods investments,
due to lost income. Moreover, the reduction in goods investments may be mitigated in
Germany, where sick pay regulations are relatively generous. To this end, a detailed
time use analysis is beyond the scope and feasibility of this paper.
In sum, the general pattern observed from Table 1.2 is that paternal health shocks
do not exert consistent impacts on behavioral skills, while we find negative and often
significant impacts of maternal health measures. This is especially true for maternal
health shocks observed after children are aged 3. The latter finding is in line with
evidence from the US (Morefield 2010) who finds that the onset of parental health
conditions is related to significant increases in children’s problem behavior at ages 5-
9 (but not at younger or older observed age categories). This finding suggests that
non-cognitive skills are more affected by poor parental health during the stage of child-
hood around school entry age.21 This is also in line with evidence from neuroscience
19One explanation for the different findings related to optional health shock definitions may be that
shocks in health satisfactions relate to different kind of health conditions than shocks in hospitaliza-
tion. For example, it may be that shocks in health satisfaction are more often due to mental health
problems while hospitalization shocks are somewhat more often due to physical health limitations.
To this end, our data does not allow distinguishing between mental and physical health conditions to
further investigate this issue. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this potential
explanation.
20A simple time-allocation model suggests this type of trade-off if the wage of the father is reduced
and the substitution effect dominates the income effect.
21Based on our results, we cannot rule out that a contemporaneous negative effect from parental
health shocks earlier in children’s life already fades out when children are observed (at age 6). The
finding in Morefield (2010) based on a longer period of observation hints to a non-significant impact
of early health shocks and a permanent effect of the parental health shock for children around school-
entry age, but in our data, we do neither observe a longer period of time nor the behavioral outcome
for three year-olds. Therefore, we cannot directly test for dynamic effects.
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demonstrating that socio-emotional skills are developed throughout different critical
and sensitive periods during childhood and adolescence (e.g. Tonks et al. 2009).22
In a next step, we conduct robustness checks in order to challenge our identifying
assumption. If parental health shocks identify causal effects, we would expect that
parental health shocks would affect future child skills outcomes while they are not
correlated to past child skills outcomes. In other words, if the same parental health
shocks that occur when the child is age six affect child outcomes at age three then
this will challenge the validity of our empirical approach. We conduct the robustness
checks using the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (VAB). In our data, the VAB is
measured for children at age three, whereas the SDQ outcome is measured at age six.
We observe parental health shock information throughout the first six years of children’s
lives. Thus, we are able to relate children’s VAB to parental health shocks prior to
and after the VAB is measured at age three. First, we regress the Vineland score on
an indicator of parental health shocks prior to child assessment and an indicator for a
shock occurring in the future.23 We control for the same set of control variables that
are included in our main regressions. As a second check, we regress adaptive behavior
solely on future parental health shocks and control variables (“placebo regressions”).
22Tonks et al. (2009) summarize that “as the demands of the social environments increase with
development, emotion-recognition abilities undergo periods of development in response” (ibid., page
12). For example for social understanding they provide evidence that specific skills are developed
throughout the childhood years (e.g. the ability to comprehend misconceiving situations is developed
around age 4). The authors note that these development periods are related to development stages of
the prefrontal cortex in childhood and adolescence.
23Our results may still be biased if (unobserved) events that affect both parental health and child
outcomes systematically happen around the time of the reported health shocks. However, in a further
robustness check we control for indicators of such events (see the discussion of Table 1.4) and find
robust results.
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Table 1.3: Impact of health shocks on adaptive behavior and robustness checks (age 3)
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
any shock shock in shock in shock in
health hospitali- satisfaction
satisfaction zation & hospitali-
(2 s.d.) (1 s.d.) zation
Effects of past parental health shocks at age 3
(A) Past health shocks Mother -0.18
∗ -0.16 -0.16 -0.21
(age 0-3) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.28)
Father 0.13 -0.03 0.21 -0.21
(age 0-3) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.52)
Robustness check 1: Effects of past and future parental health shocks at age 3
(B) Past health shocks Mother -0.18
∗∗ -0.16 -0.14 -0.22
(age 0-3) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.28)
Father 0.13 -0.04 0.23∗ -0.20
(age 0-3) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.51)
Future health shocks Mother 0.05 0.14 -0.05 0.27
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.33)
Father -0.01 0.11 -0.14 0.09
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.26)
Robustness check 2: Effects of future health shocks at age 3 (Placebo regressions)
(C) Future health shocks Mother 0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.25
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.37)
Father -0.01 0.12 -0.14 0.09
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.26)
Observations 634 634 634 634
# maternal shocks (age 0-3) 180 75 128 23
# paternal shocks (age 0-3) 70 29 44 3
# maternal shocks (age 3-6) 143 87 63 7
# paternal shocks (age 3-6) 86 53 39 6
Notes: Coefficients (robust standard errors) from regressions using the SOEP, version 28.
Regressions control for parental initial health satisfaction and hospitalization, education and
immigrant background, household income before birth, childrens gender, birth order, gestation week
of pregnancy at birth date, birth weight, a second-order polynomial of the age of the mother at the
time of childbirth and a second-order polynomial of the childrens age at the time of observation.
Outcome variables are standardized test scores (z-score). Higher scores imply more favorable skills.
∗ Statistically significant at the ten percent level of significance, ∗∗ at the five percent level and ∗∗∗
at the one percent level. s.d. = standard deviation.
Parental Health and Child Behavior 22
Table 1.3 shows that past maternal health shocks negatively impact child adaptive
behavior at age three. The point estimates are consistently negative with statistical
significance in specification (1). Even though we lack significance in the other spec-
ifications, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are robust and amount to 0.2
standard deviations. Evidence on future health shocks is provided in the bottom panels
of Table 1.3. The negative impact of past maternal health shocks on adaptive behavior
is maintained when future health shocks are included. The results consistently imply
that future health shocks are not significantly related to children’s adaptive behavior
at age 3. This is true if future and past health shocks are included in the regressions.
It also holds if only future health shocks are included in the regressions. None of the
health shock coefficients in the placebo regressions are statistically significant, and the
point estimates for maternal health shocks are positive rather than negative. Again,
the large coefficient in specification (4) is statistically indistinguishable from zero due
to a low number of health-shock observations.
Table 1.4 repeats our main regression results and adds a new set of control variables
to the specifications. These variables include indicators for maternal or paternal job
losses, parental separation or divorce, and the average household net-income in each
year of observation. In sum, these variables reflect the current (economic) situation of
the household. They may also represent events that could both trigger or result from
health shocks, and potentially exert a direct effect on children’s behavioral skills.
Table 1.4 shows that including household event variables does not qualitatively
change the estimated coefficients of parental health shocks.24 Note that the additional
control variables specifically contain household income. Therefore, one interpretation
of these robust findings is that reduced financial resources do not seem to be the main
driver of the observed effects. Consequently, the effects may be due to limited quality
or quantity of parental time. However, given the limitations of the available data, a
direct examination of these mechanisms reaches beyond the scope of our paper.25
24In addition, our results are robust if we include additional indicator variables for positive shocks
in health satisfaction. However, including only these positive shock measures yields “effects” of about
50 percent of the statistically significant estimates obtained from the original regressions. This finding
is probably due to parents being affected from a negative shock, followed by a period of recovery.
25Due to our limited sample size, we do not differentiate the results between boys and girls. How-
ever, regressing gender-specific outcomes on aggregated parental health shock indicators suggests that
impacts are more pronounced for boys (not shown here). This finding is consistent with Johnson and
Reynolds (2013) and Morefield (2010).
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Table 1.4: Robustness checks including household control variables
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
any shock shock in shock in shock in
health hospitali- satisfaction
satisfaction zation & hospitali-
(2 s.d.) (1 s.d.) zation
(A) SEB (R) Mother -0.41
∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗ -0.95∗
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.51)
(A) + additional controls Mother -0.40
∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗ -0.95∗
(age 3-6) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.51)
(B) Emotional Symptoms (R) Mother -0.47
∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗
(age 3-6) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.29)
(B) + additional controls Mother -0.45
∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗
(age 3-6) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.31)
(C) Hyperactivity (R) Mother -0.21
∗∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.17 -0.82
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.51)
(C) + additional controls Mother -0.22
∗∗ -0.23∗ -0.19 -0.83∗
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.50)
(D) Conduct Problems (R) Mother -0.20
∗∗ -0.22∗ -0.22 -0.85∗∗
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.43)
(D) + additional controls Mother -0.20
∗ -0.21∗ -0.22 -0.82∗∗
(age 3-6) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.41)
Observations 639 639 639 639
# maternal shocks (age 0-3) 183 78 126 21
# paternal shocks (age 0-3) 74 30 48 4
# maternal shocks (age 3-6) 138 85 61 8
# paternal shocks (age 3-6) 86 54 39 7
Notes: Coefficients (robust standard errors) from regressions using the SOEP, version 28.
Regressions control for parental initial health satisfaction and hospitalization, education and
immigrant background, household income before birth, children’s gender, birth order, gestation week
of pregnancy at birth date, birth weight, a second-order polynomial of the age of the mother at the
time of childbirth and a second-order polynomial of the children’s age at the time of observation. ’+
additional controls’ include maternal or paternal job losses, parental separation or divorce and the
average monthly family income in the period of observation. Outcome variables are standardized
test scores (z-score). Higher scores imply more favorable skills. ∗ Statistically significant at the ten
percent level of significance, ∗∗ at the five percent level and ∗∗∗ at the one percent level. s.d. =
standard deviation.
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1.5 Conclusion
In line with previous studies, our paper highlights the importance of parental invest-
ments in children’s skill formation. One interpretation of our findings is that an in-
voluntary change in parental (maternal) investment yields negative impacts on chil-
dren’s behavioral skill development. Specifically, maternal health shocks that occur
for children aged 3-6 are found to negatively affect the emotional symptoms, conduct
problems, and hyperactivity observed in six-year-old children. These negative effects
range up to 0.9 standard deviations, with more negative point estimates found as we
use more stringent definitions of health shocks. We do not observe negative effects of
paternal health shocks or of shocks that occur earlier in children’s lives. Our results
hold throughout several robustness checks.
The general findings of negative parental health effects on behavioral outcomes
measured around school entry age are in line with the above-mentioned study for the
US, Morefield (2010). However, Morefield (2010) also finds that paternal health plays
a more important role in shaping children’s behavioral skills in the US. Because of
different samples and estimation strategies, the findings are not directly comparable to
ours (cf. footnote 6). As discussed in the introduction of our study, one explanation for
different impacts of parental health in both countries may be institutional differences.
More generous parental benefit and sick pay regulations in Germany facilitate the role
of German mothers as predominant caregivers of their children, while the “breadwin-
ner’s” health is less important with respect to sustaining family income. These stylized
institutional differences point to a higher importance of consistent maternal health in
Germany as compared to the US.
While we observe negative impacts of maternal health on children’s behavioral skills
at age six, we cannot address long-run effects. From a theoretical point of view, the
nature of the technology of skill formation suggests that a drop in skills in one period
negatively affects skill development in later periods (Cunha et al. 2006). Still, lack
of empirical evidence on long-run effects of parental health provides scope for future
research (depending on the availability of data). If our results translated to long-run
impacts in forming children’s skills, this would point to the importance of measures
to support sick parents. To this end, additional support by external caregivers and
home-visit programs may be effective.26 Evaluation of existing programs also provides
scope for further research but is restricted by the availability of appropriate data.
26According to the German Social Security Act (Sozialgesetzbuch) sick parents can obtain domestic
help (Haushaltshilfen), which is organized by the parents’ health insurance company.
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Appendix
Table 1.5: Items of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ)
Hyperactivity:
“Child is agitated, overactive, cannot sit still”; “child is fidgety”; “child is easy to
distract, cannot concentrate”; and “child finishes tasks,can concentrate”.27
Emotional Symptoms:
“Child is often unlucky or sad, cries often”; “child is nervous in new
situations, cramps”; and “child is very anxious, frightens easily”.
Conduct Problems:
“Child tends to have a fit of rage, is explosive”; and “child argues
often with other children, bullies them”.
Peer Problems:
“Child is a maverick”; “child is popular”; “child is often fooled by others,
is bullied”; and “child gets along with adults better than with other children”.
Pro-social behavior:
“Is thoughtful”; “child likes to share with others”; “child is helpful,
if others are hurt, ill or sad”; and “child helps others willingly”.
Source: According to Goodman (1997), translations are the English labels of the SOEP items.
27Italic SDQ items correspond to a positive characteristic. The scales of all other items are reversed
to yield a positive meaning when aggregating scores.
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Table 1.6: Items of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (VAB), SOEP-version
Talking:
“Understands brief instructions, such as ‘go get your shoes’ ”; “Forms sentences
with at least two words”; “Speaks in full sentences (with four or more words)”;
“Listens attentively to a story for five minutes or longer”; “Passes on
simple messages such as ‘dinner is ready’ ”.
Everyday skills:
“Uses a spoon to eat without assistance and without dripping it”; “Blows his/her
nose without assistance”; “Uses the toilet to do ‘number two’ ”; “Puts on pants
and underpants the right way around”; “Brushes his/her teeth without assistance”.
Movement:
“Walks forwards down the stairs”; “Opens doors with the door handle”; “Climbs
up playground climbing equipment and other high playground structures”;
“Cuts paper with scissors”; “Paints/draws recognizable shapes on paper”.
Social relationships:
“Calls familiar people by name; for example, says ‘mommy’ and ‘daddy’ or uses
the father’s first name”; “Participates in games with other children”;
“Gets involved in role-playing games ‘playing pretend’)”; “Shows a special liking
for particular playmates or friends”; “Calls his/her own feelings by name,
e.g. ‘sad’, ‘happy’, ‘scared’ ”.
Source: Translations are the English labels of the SOEP items.
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Table 1.7: Means (standard deviations) of control variables included in the main re-
gression analysis
Socio-emotional Adaptive
development behavior
sample sample
Tertiary education of parents indicator 0.59 0.59
(observed at birth) (0.49) (0.49)
Indicator for missing parental education 0.08 0.09
(0.27) (0.28)
Parental migration background indicator 0.16 0.16
(observed at birth) (0.35) (0.37)
Indicator for missing parental migration 0.08 0.09
background (0.28) (0.29)
Maternal initial health satisfaction 7.58 7.56
(observed before birth) (1.89) (1.90)
Paternal initial health satisfaction 7.52 7.51
(observed before birth) (1.90) (1.88)
Maternal initial hospitalization nights 1.15 1.21
(observed before birth) (4.38) (4.48)
Paternal initial hospitalization nights 0.80 0.67
(observed before birth) (4.82) (4.00)
Monthly household income 2527.68 2528.36
(CPI adjusted, observed before birth) (1261.70) (1267.80)
Indicator for missing household income 0.17 0.17
(not observed before birth) (0.38) (0.38)
Gender: male indicator 0.48 0.47
(0.50) (0.50)
Age of child 69.06 69.11
(in months, last measurement point) (3.80) (3.82)
Birth order: first born indicator 0.45 0.45
(0.50) (0.50)
Age of mother at birth 30.78 30.73
(5.27) (5.30)
Week of pregnancy at childbirth 39.12 39.09
(2.32) (2.37)
Birth weight of child (in g) 3339.88 3333.36
(573.96) (583.29)
# Observations 639 634
Source: Mother-and-child data of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), version 28. Own
calculations.
Chapter 2
The Impact of Lengthening the
School Day on Substance Abuse
and Crime:
Evidence from a German high
school reform
2.1 Introduction
Cannabis is the most consumed illegal drug in Germany and ranks third after legal
substance alcohol and nicotine.1 Furthermore, cannabis is the most prominent illegal
drug among the youth in Germany and is considered responsible for two-thirds of
drug-related crimes among youth. Regardless of recent efforts to decriminalize the
consumption of cannabis, it is an undisputed aim to prevent children and adolescents
from consuming any form of drug. To educate students about drugs and their risks,
the school curriculum includes lessons on substance abuse prevention and is supported
by no-drug campaigns in Germany.
This study analyzes the effect of lengthening a school day in the academic high
school track on illegal substance abuse and criminal behavior. Following Germany’s
school reform, the final year of high school was eliminated, and the instructional hours
1See Drogenbeauftragte (2013) for an overview of drug consumption in Germany. Alcohol spir-
its and nicotine are forbidden substances for adolescents aged below 18 years. Beer and wine are
prohibited for those aged below 16 years.
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were shifted to lower grades. This increase in school hours reduces opportunities that
students have to obtain and consume drugs. I estimate the impact of an increase in
instructional hours on the crime rates of the age groups affected by the reform. Affected
students receive the same total number of instructional hours during graduation, which
forces them to spend more time at school in lower grade levels. This shift mainly
affected the middle grades of the high school period, whereas an increase in instructional
hours during the last years before graduation was moderate, because of an already dense
curriculum at these grade levels.
The link between education and crime has been extensively studied in the past
(Ehrlich, 1975; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003; Lochner and Moretti, 2004). Most studies
in this area rely on exogenous variation via reforms in the institutional framework to
assess the impact of education on high-risk youth groups with respect to crime. The
economic literature distinguishes between two channels through which education can
impact crime. The first channel works through an investment in education, which in-
creases the opportunity costs of committing crimes. The second channel works through
incapacitation in school or education and can be explained by the fact that the time
spent at school cannot be used to commit crimes. This incapacitation effect does not
necessarily depend on the quality of education. Kline (2012) finds that simple curfews,
as a form of incapacitation, are effective at reducing both violent and property crimes
of juveniles.
This study differs from previous literature in that I can estimate the effect of school-
ing on crimes committed by high-performing students who should be a relatively low-
risk youth group with respect to delinquent behavior. Students in an academic high
school track intend to pursue a school career beyond the minimum dropout age and
thus are not affected by changing it.
To estimate the causal impact of the high school reform on crime rates, the under-
lying analysis applies a difference-in-difference strategy, which uses variation over time
between the La¨nder (German Federal States) and the affected age groups.2 The results
suggest that the increase in instructional hours at lower grades slightly decreases over-
all crime rates of the affected age groups. However, the drop in crime rates is mostly
driven by declining violent and drug-related crimes. Furthermore, in-depth analysis
reveals that drug-related crimes decline as a consequence of decreasing arrest rates of
cannabis users in the affected age groups.
2Please see Chevalier and Marie (2016) for a description of the research method and Chevalier
and Marie (2013) for another application of the crime data.
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A common approach to study the exogenous effects of education on crime is to
monitor changes in the minimum dropout age (cf. Anderson 2014, Machin et al. 2011,
and Brilli and Tonello 2015). This identification strategy ensures that potential offend-
ers are affected by the reform because early school dropouts show higher offender rates
than classmates who remain at school. Given that these students have lower oppor-
tunity costs in education than high-performing students, one can suspect a stronger
effect of education on crime for low-performing students. However, to the best of my
knowledge, the evidence of the educational effect on crime for high-performing students
who are hardly affected by minimum dropout age regulations is scarce, especially with
regard to drug-related crimes.
Jacob and Lefgren (2003) present evidence on the contemporaneous effect of school-
ing on crime in the US using in-service days of teachers as a source of exogenous
variation.3 Their results suggest that students who are incapacitated at school have
relatively fewer possibilities to prepare for or commit criminal activities, at least in the
case of property crime. However, incapacitation of students in school increases violent
criminal behavior in the US. Similar evidence is provided by Luallen (2006) who ex-
plores the effect of teacher strike days (reduced classroom teaching time) on criminal
activities. These measured incapacitation effects are in general comparable with the
reform’s effect of increased instructional hours discussed in this study, however, they
cannot differentiate between specific secondary school types and their students.
Deming (2011) uses lotteries for attending first-choice schools to estimate the impact
of education on crime rates seven years after graduation. He shows that ‘winning’
students benefit from a higher school quality through better qualified teachers and
from less crime prone peer groups. Furthermore, he finds that ‘winning’ students have
lower crime and incarceration rates during and after their school careers. He notes that
especially in the age group of middle-school children, the peer group effect has a strong
negative influence on violent crime. However, he admits that the ‘winning’ students
are drawn from a population with a low social and economic background. These results
are in line with Becker (1968) and can be explained by the increased opportunity costs
of crime due to potentially higher earnings in the legitimate sector.
A˚slund et al. (2015) study the effect of education on crime with a Swedish reform of
the vocational upper secondary education, extending the curriculum from two to three
years. This reform targets students who are a high-risk group with respect to criminal
3Teachers have to deal with administrative duties on these in-service days, while students do not
have to attend school. Jacob and Lefgren (2003) show that these in-service days are more exogenous
than weekends or national holidays.
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behavior. They find a negative effect on property crime but not on violent crime of
the additional school year, which can be explained by an incapacitation effect too. In
comparison to this study with a focus on high-performing students, the underlying
reform of their study affected mostly low-performing students. Berthelon and Kruger’s
(2011) study relates most closely to the present research. They use a school reform in
Chile that lengthened the school day for public and publicly funded private schools.
The lengthened school day was found to reduce the likelihood of teenage pregnancy
and decrease juvenile property and violent crimes.
To my knowledge, the current study is the first that examines an educational reform
impact with a focus on substance abuse. The staggered implementation of the reform
over different La¨nder, grade levels, and years serves as a source of the exogenous
variation of schooling via instructional hours. The design of the reform allows for an
evaluation approach, which explores differences over time, age cohorts, and between
La¨nder.
The present study also provides evidence from a regional student drug survey taken
in the Land of Hamburg that supports the findings from the police crime data. It shows
that the reduction of the cannabis users after the reform was driven by a decreasing
consumption by the reform-affected students and rejects the hypothesis of drug con-
sumption shifted into school hours.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature
review and the institutional framework. Section 2.3 describes the datasets. Section 2.4
explains the identification and estimation strategy. Section 2.5 presents the results and
Section 2.6 concludes the study.
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2.2 Literature Review and Institutional Framework
2.2.1 Literature Review
Several studies use the German high school reform implementation to evaluate the
impact of the eliminated school year on educational achievements and other outcomes.4
Huebener and Marcus (2014) find that the main goal of the reform, reducing graduation
age, was achieved. But, the rate of grade repetition shortly before graduation doubled
after the reform. It is not clear whether the increase in grade repetition rates is a
long-term effect or is driven by frictions during the implementation process. Bu¨ttner
and Thomsen (2015) find negative effects of the reform on grades in math in one Land.
A similar reform occurred in the U.S., which reduced the days per week that stu-
dents spend in school. Anderson and Walker (2015) analyze the effect of a shift from
a five- to four-day school week on student achievement in rural areas. To ensure the
minimum state-mandated requirements, these schools needed to increase instructional
hours per day. Anderson and Walker find positive rather than negative effects of the
lengthened school day on math and reading test scores.
Dahmann and Anger (2014) discover that after the German high school reform
students are slightly more extroverted and less emotionally stable compared with those
from non-reformed high schools. A psychological survey by Milde-Busch et al. (2010)
does not find any difference in headache and other stress measures after the reform,
but results do show that students with a lengthened school day declare fewer hours of
spare time.
2.2.2 German Education System
Education policy is not centralized in Germany, but it is one of the main competences
of German Land’s jurisdictions, and federal responsibilities are limited. La¨nder can
reform their education systems independently of each other. However, a voluntary as-
sembly of La¨nder ministers of education coordinates reforms and ensures a comparable
set of standards.
In Germany, students begin schooling close to their 6th birthday at enrollment, in
primary school. Given this average age of students within primary school, students are,
4Cf. Ku¨hn et al. 2013, Meyer et al. (2015).
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roughly, 10 years old when tracking occurs in secondary school (high school).5 Based
on students’ competences and preferences, teachers or parents decide which track the
students should attend in their secondary school education.6
The ‘Gymnasium’ is the highest academically focused secondary school track and
covers grade levels 5-12 (i.e., 5-13 before the reform).7 Graduates from these schools
receive a general qualification of university entrance and can study at a university or
polytechnic tertiary teaching institution without any further training.
The ‘Realschule’ track offers a less academic curriculum for secondary school cov-
ering grades (5-10), and prepares students for an apprenticeship, typically leading to
white-collar jobs. The ‘Hauptschule’ track has the least academic curriculum, ending
after grade 9, and prepares students for an apprenticeship that will lead to trade or the
industrial sector. However, the tracking between Realschule and Hauptschule is less
well-defined in some La¨nder, due to comprehensive schools with a curriculum that is
more independent from the track.8
The Gymnasium track covers the majority of students in most La¨nder and was ex-
clusively subject to the high school reform. Similar vocational grammar schools with
an equivalent university entrance diploma kept the old curriculum.9 The 2001 Gym-
nasium track accommodates approximately 30% of a student’s age cohort. However,
this share has increased over the last 10 years, to approximately 40% of a student’s
age cohort in 2012.10
5Three out of sixteen La¨nder track their students after the 6th grade. Furthermore, some schools
offer a curriculum for up to three tracks within one school institution.
6Whether parents or teachers decide the optimal secondary school type depends on the legal
framework in each Land. For a detailed description of tracking in Germany, see Dustmann (2004).
7Students who start their secondary school period at other school types can switch to a Gymnasium
generally on the completion of each school year if their academic performance is high, however, students
usually switch tracks after finishing their current school and attend a Gymnasium at corresponding
later levels.
8Beyond the traditional three-track system, Germany offers comprehensive schools Gesamtschulen
and special schools for children who are physically or mentally challenged (Fo¨rderschulen). There are
also the so-called ‘Waldorf schools’ that focus on teaching with an anthroposophical approach.
9Students in vocational grammar schools can receive university entrance qualification even after
graduation; however, the high school phase of vocational schools remained until the 13th grade and
was not affected by the reform.
10Based on the Annual Report of general education from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany,
2001-2012.
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2.2.3 G8 Reform
The object of the reform, which eliminated the last high school year, was to support
students with an earlier entry into the university (or job market) in accordance with
international education systems. Hence, the years of secondary education in the Gym-
nasium decreased from nine years (G9 ) to eight years (G8 ).11
After the reform, the total number of instructional hours remained constant, how-
ever, as the length of the school day increased at the lower grade levels.12 However,
the workload at the first two grades in the Gymnasium (grades 5 and 6) was rarely in-
creased to avoid extra burden during the transition from primary to secondary school.13
And, the already high number of instructional hours at the final stage of the Gymna-
sium (grades 11 and 12) prevent any additional increase of instructional hours at prior
to graduation. As a result, the ‘shifted’ instructional hours of the old 13th grade were
mainly distributed among grades 7 to 10, which increased the instructional hours per
day by up to 20%. Many schools switched from a half-day to a full-day program to
deal with the reform.
The implementation of the G8 reform was staggered over the La¨nder and with dif-
ferent grade levels affected first. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the implementation
in the German La¨nder. Two East German La¨nder, Saxony and Thuringia, had not
changed the high school length after reunification, and were already operating under
the G8 policy. However, the other East German La¨nder adopted the West German
G9 regime after reunification in 1990. The first West German Land to introduce the
shorter high school system was Saarland, altering the 5th grade in the 2001/2002 school
year. The first graduates of this reform finished school in the double G8 and G9 gradu-
ation year, 2009. However, Saxony-Anhalt was the first Land with a double graduation
cohort in 2007. As the G8 reform in the 2003/2004 school year affected the 9th grade
and below, the 9th and 10th grades of the 2003/2004 school year graduated together in
2007.14
11G9 refers to the old school regime and G8 refers to the new reformed school regime.
12According to the Kultusminsiterkonferenz (KMK, 2013), the average hours per week in the
Gymnasium increased from 29.44 to 33.13.
13Some La¨nder foster easier transitions between the different school tracks at the entrance to the
secondary school phase. In the so-called ‘Orientierungsstufe’ or ‘Fo¨rderstufe which covers the 5th and
6th grade, student tracking is less strict.
14For further information regarding the relative short implementation phase in Saxony-Anhalt and
the impact on educational outcomes, see Bu¨ttner and Thomsen (2015).
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Figure 2.1 plots the actual share of reform affected Gymnasium students relative
to all Gymnasium students across the La¨nder for the years 1998 to 2012 by two- and
three-year age groups. The staggered implementation starts around 2002. However,
due to the La¨nder Saxony and Thuringia, which had the G8 regime since 1949, a small
fraction of G8 Gymnasia was already present prior to 2002.
Figure 2.1: Relative share of students in the G8 track relative to all Gymnasium
students (G8 and G9 )
Notes: Based on administrative student data. This graph shows the shares of students in the G8-
reformed track relative to all Gymnasium students (with and without reform) for specific age groups.
The students share is based on the G8-reformed students in each grade level, but refers to the corre-
sponding age groups in the respective grade levels.
Figure 2.1 shows that the G8 reform has affected almost all Gymnasium students,
with over 80% of academic high school students were affected since 2011.
Since the crime data used in this analysis is mostly aggregated over two-year age
cohorts, I calculate the share of G8 -reformed students based on the corresponding two
year grade levels. Due to this fact, it may be that only one half of a two-year age
cohort was affected by the reform. Furthermore, only the 18-year-olds in the three-
year age group of 18 to 20-year-olds could be affected by the reform, which reduces
the maximum reform impact to one third of this three-year age cohort. To capture the
maximum reform impact for further analysis, I construct a G8 reform dummy which
takes the value of 1 when the Gymnasium track of a two-year age group was subject
to the G8 reform in a given year and Land. The G8 reform dummy takes the value of
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1
2
when only one age cohort out of the two-year age group is affected in a given year.15
The dummy variable takes the value of 0 for all other (not reformed) age groups in a
given year.
2.2.4 Implications of the G8 Reform for Crime
Theoretically, it is not clear whether the G8 reform would increase or decrease the
crimes committed by affected students. Students could exhibit higher stress measures
due to an increased workload, in comparison with students receiving the standard
curriculum. One way to cope with the increased stress, at least in the short run, could
be escapism through increased drug consumption. Violent crimes could also increase
if students act out through violent behavior or are more short-tempered and engage
more frequently in physical conflicts as a result of increased stress brought on by the
G8 reform. However, Milde-Busch et al. (2010) show that stress measures for reform-
affected students are not significantly higher than those of high school students prior
to the G8 reform.16
Alternatively, increased instructional hours leave students with less residual time
for committing crimes. This form of incapacitation means that students cannot commit
crimes outside the school as long as they are in school. A similar effect may occur when
students invest more time in studying at home to cope with the increased curriculum
content, a form of self-incapacitation.17
While it seems theoretically feasible to just shift the crime to the after-school time
of day or the weekends, the G8 reform reduced the residual spare time of students and
therefore hampered criminal behavior through simple displacement. In general, crimes
and drug consumption can increase within the school environment too simply because
the lengthened school day offers more opportunities to commit crimes during school
hours.18 However, this effect should be less relevant for high-performing students who
have an educational aspiration and pursue an academic school track. Furthermore,
teacher supervision makes committing crimes difficult in the school, including recess
15This can be the case in the introduction phase of the G8 reform, when only the younger or lower
age cohort of a two-year age group was affected. Furthermore, the G8 reform dummy takes the value
of 13 to account for the reform-affected 18-year-old students in the 18-20 age cohort.
16In fact, Milde-Busch et al. (2010) find that the stress measures of Gymnasium students are high
irrespective of the G8 reform.
17Given the age of a student, this form of self-incapacitation may even be enforced by the parents,
especially for younger students.
18Luallen (2006) finds that this effect is present in the U.S. for violent crime, but not for other
types of crime.
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and small breaks within school days. I will assess this potential effect for cannabis
consumption with a student drug survey in Section 2.5.3.
2.3 Data
To study the G8 reform’s impact on crime, I compile various datasets that record
crimes and substance abuse. To link the crime data with the G8 -reformed students, I
rely on yearly student enrollment data which records the number of students in different
school tracks and grades. Additionally, I gather annual information from the Federal
Statistical Office to use as control variables, including the population size of an age
cohort, unemployment rate, youth unemployment rate, and police expenditures.
2.3.1 Police Crime Statistics (PKS)
The police crime statistics (PKS) used in this study is administered by the federal
criminal police office.19 These data allow for a comparison of crime rates among all
La¨nder in Germany since 1993. An annual sample of the data covers all offenders, their
criminal charges, gender, and corresponding age group. The recorded crime charges
are based on police arrests rather than on criminal convictions, which might differ. I
use these data until the most recent wave in 2012 and observe the groups with the
following age cohorts (in years): 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-20, and 21-22. The
population between the ages 10 and 18 can be, in general, subject to the G8 reform,
whereas those aged 19 to 22 years are not and serve only for further analysis.20
The detailed description of law violations allow me to aggregate categories of
violent-, property-, and drug-related crimes. Aggregated violent crimes include as-
saults, homicides, and robberies. Aggregated property crimes capture any forms of
theft. Aggregated drug-related crimes include all possessions or trades of illegal sub-
stances and any crimes associated with obtaining drugs. The fact that the police only
reports crimes where a charge occurs, and that the true crime rate is probably higher, is
not a serious measurement error as long as the fraction of reported crimes with respect
19Source: PKS Bundeskriminalamt, 1998-2012. Data license Germany,- attribution Version 2.0.
www.bka.de/DE/Publikationen/PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik
20The age cohorts of the years 19-22 make it possible to analyze potential catch-up effects of former
G8 track students after their school career.
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to the true crime rate is not affected by the G8 reform. Furthermore, the police can
only charge a crime in the data if the suspect is known.21
2.3.2 Student Enrollment Data
To link youth crime rates with student data, I gather the student enrollment share
in the G8 and G9 regimes, based on the Annual Report of general education from
the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. These data provide the number of students
in each school type for each school grade in the different La¨nder beginning in school
year 1998/1999 until 2012/2013.22 These data also allow me to capture the share of
students in the old G9 regime and the new G8 regime, which is necessary to link each
to age group-specific crime rates. Since it is not possible to identify the actual age of
students within one grade in a given school year, I use the legal age at school start to
determine the grade level of the age groups in the youth crime data.
Due to the half-year shift in the school year with respect to the calendar year, I
assign half of the students in the 5th grade as 10-year-olds and the other half as 11-year-
olds. This results in a graduation age of 17 and 18 years, respectively, when students
finish the G8 -reformed Gymnasium following completion of the 12th grade. This does
not account for grade repetitions by affected students. Huebener and Marcus (2015)
find that the repetition rates in the last three grades before graduation have increased
due to the G8 reform, which could bias the results for older students. However, grade
repetition is least frequent in the Gymnasium among the traditional secondary school
branches. To merge the two year groups’ crime data, I aggregate the students’ school
enrollment data. To account for potential correlation of residuals within La¨nder and
across age cohorts, I cluster the standard errors for all models estimated with the PKS
data on the Land level.23
21The overall crime clearance ratio is, on average, 55%, but varies strongly with specific crimes.
The drug-related and violent crime clearance ratios are over 95% and 80%, respectively.
22Data are missing in the school year 2000/2001 for Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt, which I inter-
polate with the average number of students in the previous and following school years.
23The results for the small number of clusters due to only 16 federal La¨nder are confirmed by
regressions with a wild bootstrap procedure and other cluster units (i.e., interaction of Land and
birth cohort).
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2.3.3 Schulbus Survey Data
The Schulbus Survey, a study on substance abuse among adolescents in the Land of
Hamburg, was conducted between 2004 and the most recent wave of 2012, and covers
students between the ages of 14 and 17 years. In total, the sample covers the years
2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2012. The introduction of the G8 reform in Hamburg in
the school year 2002/2003 only with the 5th grade ensures that I have a reasonable
number of older Gymnasium students that were not affected. All fourteen-year-old
Gymnasium students up to 2005 were already too old to be affected, whereas the
fourteen- and fifteen-year-old Gymnasium students in 2007 were the first ones affected
by the G8 reform; from 2009 on, all Gymnasium students younger than seventeen-
years-old were subject to the G8 reform. The survey is a repeated cross-section sample
of secondary school students and explores students’ general substance abuse, whether
drug experiences were gained within the school environment, and the prevalence of
substance abuse within peer-groups. The original sample consists of 5,508 students in
the different implementation waves. I drop the students whose place of residence is un-
clear (405 observations) and those students who are enrolled at schools in surrounding
La¨nder (169 observations).24 The data offer a self-assessed cannabis addiction measure
and questions with respect to drug prevalence in school, peer-groups, and life in general.
2.4 Identification and Estimation Strategy
To estimate the effect of an intensified curriculum in affected high schools on youth
crime rates, I define the crime rate (CR) of an age group (i) in a Land (s) for a given
year (t):
CRist = ln(
Recordsist
Populationist
)
The crime rate is the logarithm of the number of offenders divided by the corre-
sponding population of the age group in a Land for a given year. Due to the fact, that
the crime data is based on a two-year age group I sum up the share of affected students
in groups of two grade levels respectively.
24In general, these students could be used as a control group also because of the later implemen-
tation in the surrounding La¨nder. However, the data do not differentiate between the surrounding
La¨nder of Hamburg.
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First, I will show baseline estimates with a G8 reform dummy following the ap-
proach by Chevalier and Marie (2013). The G8 reform dummy indicates when a
Gymnasium track of an age cohort was subject to the G8 reform in a given year and
Land. In a further step, I regress the crime rates on the actual share of students within
the new G8 track to estimate the effect of intensified schooling on crime. The variable
G8 shareist captures the share of students in the ‘new high school regime’ relative to
all adolescents in this age group. I rely on three different specifications to assess the
causal impact of the intensified curriculum on crime rates.
The basic specification has the following structure:
CRist = βG8 shareist +
∑
i
γiAgei +
∑
t
µtY eart +
∑
s
αsDs + ist (1)
The variables Agei account for the fixed effects of each age group, Y eart absorbs all
year-specific effects, and Ds captures La¨nder fixed effects.
Specification 2 adds control variables captured by the matrix Xst:
CRist = βG8 shareist +
∑
i
γiAgei +
∑
t
µtY eart +
∑
s
αsDs + ϕXst + ist (2)
The additional control variables account for the Land ’s level of police expenditures, the
youth unemployment rates for people under the age of 25, and the overall unemploy-
ment rates for each year in each Land. Specification 3 adds Land -specific time trends
in linear and quadratic forms,
∑∑
TtDs and
∑∑
T 2t Ds:
CRist = βG8 shareist +
∑
i
γiAgei +
∑
t
µtY eart +
∑
s
αsDs + ϕXst
+
∑
s
∑
t
δsTtDs +
∑
s
∑
t
λsT
2
t Ds + ist (3)
The staggered implementation of the G8 reform allows for an identification of
the reform’s impact on crime via (1) differences over time, (2) within La¨nder, and
(3) in the age groups’ proportion of students affected by the G8 reform. I use this
variation to apply a difference-in-difference approach and assess the causal impact of
lengthening the school day on crime outcomes. The sample population comprises of
students between the ages of 10 and 22 from all La¨nder between the school years
1998/99 and 2012/13.
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All results of the estimates with the G8 reform dummy and the actual G8 -reformed
share of students can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, based on a marginal increase of
students in the reformed G8 track: a one percentage point increase of affected students
in the G8 track triggers a β increase in the specific crime rate. The standard errors
are clustered on the Land level.25
In the evaluation of the student drug survey, I estimate the effect of the G8 reform
on several drug-related binary outcomes using linear probability models. The G8 re-
form dummy is equal to 1 for all Gymnasium students after the G8 reform and 0 for
pre-reform (G9 ) Gymnasium students and students from other school tracks.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Crime
We now turn to the econometric analysis of crime data and start with treatment of the
G8 reform dummy as a baseline estimation. The underlying sample for this analysis
comprises the population aged 10 to 22 years in all La¨nder (16) between 1998 and 2012.
Table 2.2 includes the regression results from the estimations with a G8 reform dummy
that assumes the full age cohort is affected by the G8 reform. Panel (A) of Table 2.2
presents the G8 reform impact on the total crime rate. Specification (1) includes
Land -, year-, and age group-fixed effects; Specification (2) adds police expenditure and
the overall- (youth-) unemployment rate; Specification (3) adds linear and quadratic
Land time trends. Specification (1) shows a small negative effect of −0.05 with the
G8 reform dummy, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. Specification (2)
does not show a statistically significant estimate. However, in Specification (3) with
the full set of control variables, one sees a point estimate of −0.06, which is statistically
significant at the 5% level. This estimate suggests that the overall crime rate would
decrease by 6% if the full age cohort were affected by the G8 reform.
Panel (B) includes the regression results for drug-related crimes. All Specifications
(1)-(3) show a statistically negative effect of the G8 reform on drug-related crimes.
Specification (1) estimates a decrease of −0.20 due to the G8 reform, which is sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. Specification (2) shows a slightly larger drop by
25In the case of a Land and cohorts interaction as the cluster unit, regression results deliver smaller
standard errors than just the Land as a cluster unit. Therefore, I use only the Land level as a cluster
unit to rely on the more conservative estimates. For further information, see Section 2.5.2 for a
discussion of the standard errors.
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Table 2.2: Reform dummy impact on different crime rates
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Overall Crime Rate
Reform -0.053* -0.035 -0.063**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Observations 1,440 1,344 1,344
R2 0.272 0.222 0.349
(B) Drug-related Crime Rate
Reform -0.202** -0.241*** -0.143**
(0.069) (0.073) (0.066)
Observations 1,376 1,286 1,286
R2 0.353 0.381 0.460
(C) Violent Crime Rate
Reform -0.094* -0.043 -0.091*
(0.044) (0.044) (0.046)
Observations 1,440 1,344 1,344
R2 0.325 0.364 0.479
(D) Property Crime Rate
Reform -0.009 0.006 -0.017
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027)
Observations 1,440 1,344 1,344
R2 0.685 0.681 0.725
Land, Year, and
Age Group Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Police Expenditure No Yes Yes
(Youth) Unemployment No Yes Yes
Land Specific Time Trends No No Yes
Number of clusters 16 16 16
Notes: Based on PKS and administrative student data with the age groups from 10 to 22. Observation
period 1998 - 2012 for specification 1 and 1998 - 2011 for specification 2 and 3. Panel B looses
observation due to zero incidences of drug-related crimes in some La¨nder for a few age groups in
certain years. All specifications control for the absolute population in a given age group. Standard
errors are clustered on the Land level and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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−0.24, with statistical significance at the 1% level. Specification (3) shows a slightly
smaller point estimate of −0.14, but is still statistically significant at the 5% level.
The effect on the violent crime rate is shown in Panel (C). Again, one sees a negative
influence of the G8 reform on the violent crime rate. Specifications (1) and (3) have
virtually the same point estimate at −0.09, and are statistically significant at the 10%
level. Specification (2) fails to estimate a statistically significant effect, but shows the
same negative relation as Specifications (1) and (3). Panel (D) includes the G8 reform
impact on the property crime rate. The point estimates are not statistically significant
and are close to zero, which suggests no effect of the G8 reform on property crimes.
To further analyze the negative effect on drug-related and violent crimes, we turn
now to the G8 reform impact measured with the student’s share in the reformed
G8 track (Share in G8 track) on student crime rates. The independent variable in
Table 2.3 captures the percentage of affected students within one age group. Panel (A)
of Table 2.3 presents the effect on the overall crime rate. Specification (1) and
the strictest Specification (3) estimate a decrease in the overall crime rate of −0.14
(statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively) due to the reform
affected G8 students. One can interpret the effect as follows: for each additional
percentage point of affected students, the overall crime rate declines by 0.14%. The
estimate from Specification (2), with fixed effects and controls for police expenditures,
unemployment rates, and youth unemployment rates, diminishes to −0.08 and loses
statistical significance.
In a next step, I analyze the G8 reform’s impact on different types of crime rates.
Table 2.3 reports in Panel (B) the effect of the G8 reform on drug-related crimes.
Again, Specification (1), which is controlling for Land, age, and year fixed effects,
indicates a drop in drug-related crimes of −0.62 due to the G8 reform. This effect is
statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect in Specification (2) even increases
to −0.78 (still statistically significant at the 1% level) when Land -specific control
variables are included. Specification (3), with additional Land -specific time trends,
again shows an estimate of −0.59 (statistically significant at the 1% level). This is
a huge effect with respect to the magnitude. Given that on average, one-third of a
student’s age group attends a Gymnasium, the G8 reform reduces the drug-related
crimes by 20%. With respect to the absolute drop in the drug-related crime rate,
this 20% decrease relates to a 0.11 percentage points reduction relative to the average
drug-related crime rate of 0.55 percentage points.
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Table 2.3: G8 reform impact on different crime rates
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Overall Crime Rate
Share in -0.135** -0.078 -0.135*
G8 Track (0.061) (0.066) (0.077)
Observations 1,440 1,344 1,344
R2 0.274 0.221 0.345
(B) Drug-related Crime Rate
Share in -0.617*** -0.778*** -0.585***
G8 Track (0.177) (0.197) (0.135)
Observations 1,376 1,286 1,286
R2 0.355 0.387 0.467
(C) Violent Crime Rate
Share in -0.362*** -0.216* -0.333***
G8 Track (0.099) (0.102) (0.101)
Observations 1,440 1,344 1,344
R2 0.340 0.372 0.487
(D) Property Crime Rate
Share in 0.018 0.074 0.038
G8 Track (0.063) (0.071) (0.086)
Observations 1,440 1,344 1,344
R2 0.685 0.682 0.725
Land, Year, and
Age Group Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Police Expenditure No Yes Yes
(Youth) Unemployment No Yes Yes
Land Specific Time Trends No No Yes
Number of clusters 16 16 16
Notes: Based on PKS and administrative student data with the age groups from 10 to 22. Observation
period 1998 - 2012 for specification 1 and 1998 - 2011 for specification 2 and 3. Panel B looses
observation due to zero incidences of drug-related crimes in some La¨nder for a few age groups in
certain years. All specifications control for the absolute population in a given age group. Standard
errors are clustered on the Land level and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Panel (C) of Table 2.3 shows regression results from the share of G8 track stu-
dents and violent crimes. All Specifications (1)-(3) show a negative sign in the range
of −0.22 to −0.36 and are statistically significant. Specification (1) shows the highest
negative impact of −0.36 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifica-
tion (2), with further control variables, estimates a slightly lower effect of −0.22, which
is only statistically significant at the 10% level. Specification (3), with the full set of
control variables and time trends, shows a higher point estimate of −0.33 and is again
statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect on violent crime in this estimation
confirms the negative relationship, which was estimated before with the simple treat-
ment dummy. Panel (D) of Table 2.3 reports the estimated effect of the G8 reform
on property crimes. The point estimates over all Specifications are positive; however,
none of the estimates are statistically significant due to large standard errors.
Table 2.4: Age group specific G8 reform impact on drug-related crimes
(1) (2) (3)
Drug-related Crime Rate
Share in G8 -2.343** -1.903* -1.283
at Age 10-11 (0.969) (1.046) (1.001)
Share in G8 -0.907*** -1.032*** -0.807***
at Age 12-13 (0.286) (0.298) (0.270)
Share in G8 -0.406** -0.592*** -0.460***
at Age 14-15 (0.167) (0.191) (0.139)
Share in G8 -0.319 -0.469* -0.365*
at Age 16-17 (0.206) (0.227) (0.190)
Share in G8 -0.252 -0.372 -0.281
at Age 18-20 (0.719) (0.922) (0.791)
Land, Year, and
Age Group Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Police Expenditure No Yes Yes
(Youth) Unemployment No Yes Yes
Land Specific Time Trends No No Yes
Observations 1,376 1,286 1,286
R2 0.3751 0.3969 0.4720
Number of clusters 16 16 16
Notes: Based on PKS and administrative student data with the age groups from 10 to 22. Observation
period 1998 - 2012 for specification 1 and 1998 - 2011 for specification 2 and 3. All specifications control
for the absolute population in a given age group. Standard errors are clustered on the Land level and
reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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An analysis of different effects of the affected age groups with respect to drug-related
crimes is shown in Table 2.4. The table includes effects from one single regression with
a set of variables capturing the share of students in the G8 track of each age group.
The biggest effect is present for the youngest age group (10-11) in Specification (1) with
a point estimate of −2.34, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. However,
the effect diminishes slightly in Specifications (2) and (3) and is no longer statistically
significant in the strictest Specification (3). Robust estimates with respect to the dif-
ferent specifications are present for the age groups (12-13) and (14-15), which indicates
an almost twice as high effect for the younger group (12-13). The effect of this group
(12-13) varies between −0.81 and −1.03 and is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The slightly older age group (14-15) shows a drop from −0.41 to −0.59, with higher
negative effects in Specifications (2) and (3). Whereas the effect in Specification (1)
is statistically significant at the 5% level, Specifications (2) and (3) show a statistical
significance of the effect at the 1% level. The point estimates of the older age group
(16-17) are negative too; however, only Specifications (2) and (3) yield a statistically
significant effect at the 10% level for the age group (16-17). Furthermore, the effect
of the share of G8 -reformed students is not statistically significant for the oldest age
group (18-20). One has to bear in mind that only the 18-year-old students in this age
group were subject to the G8 reform and only for a half-calendar year.26 As described
before, an increase in grade repetition could bias the results of these age groups (16-17
and 18-20) and one should treat these results with caution.
Table 2.5 focuses solely on the G8 reform’s impact on cannabis, which is the most
prominent illegal drug in Germany and accounts for more than half of all drug-related
crimes. One can expect that the G8 reform has diverse results when discriminating
between the serious crime of dealing and the rather delinquent behavior of the pure
consumption of cannabis. Therefore, Table 2.5 separates between the G8 reform
impact on the rate of dealing with cannabis and the rate of consuming cannabis.
Panel (A) of Table 2.5 shows the effect from the relative students intake in the
G8 track effect on the cannabis dealing rate. The G8 reform seemed not to have an
effect on the actual rate of dealers. Panel (B) of Table 2.5 presents the effect on the
cannabis use rate. The negative point estimates of Specifications (1)-(3) range from
−0.60 to −0.81 and are all statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting a strong
negative effect of the G8 reform on the cannabis consumption of a student’s age group.
26Since the German school year ends usually in June or July, the overlap of the student enrollment
data and yearly crime data (based on the calendar year) is reduced to one-half.
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Table 2.5: G8 reform impact on cannabis dealing and consuming rate
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Cannabis Dealing Crime Rate
Share in -0.067 -0.248 -0.238
G8 Track (0.260) (0.294) (0.268)
Observations 1,218 1,138 1,138
R2 0.323 0.337 0.475
(B) Cannabis Consuming Crime Rate
Share in -0.602*** -0.812*** -0.719***
G8 Track (0.172) (0.199) (0.172)
Observations 1,350 1,263 1,263
R2 0.340 0.367 0.442
Land, Year, and
Age Group Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Police Expenditure No Yes Yes
(Youth) Unemployment No Yes Yes
Land Specific Time Trends No No Yes
Number of clusters 16 16 16
Notes: Based on PKS and administrative student data with the age groups from 10 to 22. Observation
period 1998 - 2012 for specification 1 and 1998 - 2011 for specification 2 and 3. Panel A looses
observation due to zero incidences of crimes related to dealing with cannabis in some La¨nder for a
few age groups in certain years. All specifications control for the absolute population in a given age
group. Standard errors are clustered on the Land level and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The fact that the share of other school types has varied over recent years, as the share
of students in Gymnasium has increased, makes it possible that newer trends in the
school type composition are correlated with the G8 reform. Therefore, I estimate the
effects from G8 -reformed students on drug-related crimes while controlling for other
shares of school types. The share of other school types (Hauptschule, Realschule, and
comprehensive schools) or the share of the non-reformed G9 track do not drive the
estimates of the G8 -reformed students. Estimations with the share of G8 and G9
track students occasionally deliver a higher level of statistical significance for the effect
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of the share in the G8 track; however, the point estimates of the students in the G9
track are closer to zero and never statistically significant.
All estimation results from the share of students in the G8 track and the police
crime data show the same level of significance when the standard errors are clustered
on the interaction between Land and cohorts. Due to lower standard errors of this and
other cluster units, the presented results with the Land as cluster delivers the most
conservative results (largest standard errors) as suggested by Bertrand et al.(2004).
The fact, that the Land and cohort cluster units deliver larger standard errors suggests
that serial correlation seems to be not present in the underlying panel data.
However, the problem of too few clusters due to only sixteen German La¨nder might
generate over-rejection resulting in too narrow confidence intervals as discussed in
Cameron and Miller (2015). Therefore, I perform all regression results as a robustness
check with a wild bootstrap procedure. The estimations confirm the significance of the
results derived from regressions with the police crime statistics and student drug survey
and do not deliver wider/broader confidence intervals. Regression results with only the
G8 reform-affected sample [without the unaffected age group (21-22)], do not change
the estimates of the G8 reform effect on the crime behavior of younger G8 -affected
students.
To estimate if a ‘catch-up’ effect takes place in the years after the graduation of
G8 reform-affected students, I estimate a model where another treatment dummy
indicates former G8 track students. This treatment dummy follows students who
attended the G8 -reformed Gymnasium after their school career is finished and they
potentially pursue a tertiary education or an apprenticeship. This after school reform
dummy follows G8 reform-affected age cohorts after graduation from the Gymnasium,
when they are between 19- and 22-years-old. One could expect to see an effect if former
G8 track students use the time after graduation to engage in criminal activity, because
the time and commitment constraints of G8 -reformed Gymnasium prevented them
from doing so earlier. However, given that not all La¨nder finished so far the G8 reform
implementation and others just released their first double graduation cohorts, these
results should be treated with caution due to a low number of former G8 -affected
students. With respect to drug-related crimes, it appears that no catch-up effect is
taking place. Occasionally, the negative impact of former G8 track students on drug-
related crimes seems to be prolonged after high school graduation; however, the effect
is not robust over all specifications. The negative effect of the G8 reform on violent
crimes could face a catch-up effect after high school graduation. The impact of former
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G8 track students with the after school reform dummy on violent crimes is positive
and comparable with the negative violent crime effect of the share of G8 track students
with respect to the magnitude.27
To deal with the potential problem of grade repetition as discussed by Huebener and
Marcus (2015), I estimate all regression results from the crime data with an additional
control for the share of grade repetition, which was affected at least partially by the
reform. I use one variable for the grade repetition of Gymnasium students and another
variable for all other school types. These variables control for the lagged (previous
year) grade repetition rate of the school types in the next higher grade level. These
control variables take into account that grade repeating students show up in the crime
data in the next higher age cohort even when they remain in the grade level from the
previous year. These regression results suggest that the presented G8 -reform effect on
crime is not driven by the increased grade repetition of reform-affected students.28
2.5.3 Survey Data
We turn now from the effects of the official crime statistics to the impact of the
G8 reform on the student drug survey to provide further evidence of reduced drug-
consumption. To make sure that the effect was mainly driven by the affected students
in the high school track and not by changes in the drug consumption of students in
other school tracks, I now turn to a student drug survey. Potentially, one could think
that the effect from the G8 -reformed students exerts an additional effect on the peer
group of G8 -students if the peer group is distributed across different school types.
The sample consists of a repeated cross-section and covers students from reformed
as well as non-reformed schools of different types. The G8 reform took place within
the third wave of the survey and affected all Gymnasium students in the last two
waves. The Schulbus survey data from the Land of Hamburg is evaluated using a
linear probability model, which assigns all Gymnasium students after the G8 reform
with a reform dummy.
Table 2.6 shows the impact of the G8 reform on cannabis consumption within the
school environment. The definition of school environment includes the school grounds
and external school trips. The first three columns capture the estimates of the full-
sample and columns four to six restrict the sample to students younger than sixteen
27These regression results are reported in Table 2.10 in the Appendix.
28Results are available from the author upon request.
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years. This assures that the sample is not driven by sample selection of school dropouts
and early starters in the job market. Furthermore, this age group faced the biggest
increase of ‘shifted’ school hours. The negative relation of the G8 reform on the
consumption of cannabis within the school environment is statistically significant in
the specification without controls [(1) and (4)] and some control variables [(2) and
(5)] for the full and age-restricted samples, respectively. Although the relation is not
significant, it is negative in the specifications (3) and (6) which include the full set of
control variables.
If this effect were positive, then the drop in the police crime statistics could be
explained by a shift of crime to the school environment due to the longer school hours.
This could be the case if delinquencies within the school environment are more likely to
be sanctioned by teachers rather than the police to reduce administrative duties or to
preserve the school’s reputation. Furthermore, police patrols, which are less prevalent
in schoolyards than outside the school environment, could result in fewer crimes being
detected by the police. The evidence clearly rejects that the consumption of cannabis
was shifted into the school environment. In fact the (insignificant) negative point
estimates indicate that cannabis consumption within the school has slightly decreased
as instructional hours increased.
Table 2.6: G8 reform impact on cannabis using in school within the last year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cannabis usage in school environment
Reform -0.040*** -0.071*** -0.029 -0.049*** -0.059*** -0.029
(0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.025)
Male 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Fixed Effects for ...
Age Groups No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
School Types No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Waves No No Yes No No Yes
Districts No No Yes No No Yes
Sample age : 14− 17 age : 14− 15
Observations 3,005 2,989 2,989 1,741 1,733 1,733
R2 0.004 0.042 0.057 0.008 0.024 0.044
Notes: Based on weighted survey data from Schulbus waves. Observation period 2004 - 2012. Cannabis
in school is a dummy variable equal to one if at least once cannabis was consumed in the school
environment within the last 12 months, zero otherwise. The definition of school environment includes,
among others, (breaks at) the schoolyard and school excursions. Robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The negative effect of the G8 reform on drug consumption that I identified in
the crime statistics is also present in the student drug survey. Table 2.7 shows the
regression results for an indicator of cannabis addiction as a dependent variable.29
Table 2.7: G8 reform impact on cannabis addiction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cannabis addiction
Reform -0.024*** 0.032 0.008 -0.032*** -0.007 -0.024*
(0.009) (0.019) (0.022) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Male 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.041***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Fixed Effects for ...
Age Groups No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
School Types No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Waves No No Yes No No Yes
Districts No No Yes No No Yes
Sample age : 14− 17 age : 14− 15
Observations 2,345 2,329 2,329 1,408 1,400 1,400
R2 0.003 0.023 0.027 0.007 0.021 0.030
Notes: Based on weighted survey data from Schulbus waves. Observation period 2004 - 2012. Cannabis
addiction is observed if at least 2 items of the Severity of Dependence Scale apply. Robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
For the full sample, only the first specification (with only a male dummy indica-
tor) shows a statistically negative relationship. For the sample restriction to the age
group (14-15), Specifications (4)-(6) indicate a negative sign that ranges from −0.01 to
−0.03. Specification (6), with the full set of control variables, suggests that the rate of
cannabis-addicted students decreased by −0.02% for 14- to 15-year-old students after
introduction of the G8 reform.30
Table 2.8 shows the effect on the cannabis prevalence within the peer groups of
G8 -reformed students. The outcome variable is a dummy equal to one whenever the
student indicates that half or more of their peer group has experiences with cannabis.
Again, one finds that the G8 reform goes in line with a decreasing prevalence of
29Cannabis addiction is measured with a binary variable that is equal to one if at least two out of
five items of cannabis addiction symptoms apply. The 5 symptoms are measured on the Severity of
Dependence Scale and defined in the Appendix.
30The results are robust when only the sub-sample of males is considered for the regression.
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cannabis within the peer group. Although the Specifications (1) and (4) as well as
(2) and (5) show a highly statistically significant relation, significance vanishes in the
most strict Specifications (3) and (6).
Table 2.8: G8 reform impact on cannabis prevalence in peer-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cannabis prevalence in peer-group
Reform -0.088*** -0.061*** -0.014 -0.126*** -0.079*** -0.032
(0.015) (0.020) (0.029) (0.016) (0.027) (0.040)
Male 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.042** 0.039** 0.036**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Fixed Effects for ...
Age Groups No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
School Types No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Waves No No Yes No No Yes
Districts No No Yes No No Yes
Sample age : 14− 17 age : 14− 15
Observations 3,652 3,636 3,636 2,094 2,086 2,086
R2 0.009 0.056 0.076 0.021 0.056 0.066
Notes: Based on weighted survey data from Schulbus waves. Observation period 2004 - 2012. Cannabis
prevalence in peer-group is a dummy variable equal to one if at least half of the peer-group is consuming
cannabis, zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Table 2.9 shows the G8 reform impact on the monthly prevalence of cannabis
consumption in the top panel and the lifetime prevalence in the bottom panel. The
negative and statistically significant pattern of estimates from the less strict spec-
ifications is present here, too. The fact that the point estimates for the lifetime
prevalence is more than twice as high could explain that the G8 reform impact
is more likely to have an effect on the extensive margin and less on the intensive
margin. In other words, the G8 reform seemed to have stopped students from starting
to use cannabis or delayed the starting age rather than making them just consume less.
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Table 2.9: G8 reform impact on cannabis prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cannabis 30-day prevalence
Reform -0.020* -0.005 0.017 -0.038*** -0.017 0.003
(0.012) (0.016) (0.023) (0.013) (0.021) (0.030)
Male 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.064***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 3,847 3,831 3,831 2,219 2,211 2,211
R2 0.001 0.033 0.040 0.004 0.028 0.036
Cannabis lifetime prevalence
Reform -0.066*** -0.066*** 0.047 -0.104*** -0.105*** 0.035
(0.016) (0.022) (0.033) (0.017) (0.030) (0.043)
Male 0.104*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.080***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 3,849 3,833 3,833 2,221 2,213 2,213
R2 0.005 0.062 0.081 0.013 0.041 0.059
Fixed Effects for ...
Age Groups No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
School Types No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Waves No No Yes No No Yes
Districts No No Yes No No Yes
Sample age : 14− 17 age : 14− 15
Notes: Based on Schulbus. Observation period 2004 - 2012. Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.6 Conclusion
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the moderate decline in the overall crime
rate is due to the stronger decline in drug-related and violent crimes. However, this
reduction can be mainly explained by a drop in delinquencies of the cannabis-user rate
rather than the use of hard drugs or even drug dealers. Furthermore, the analysis
provides evidence that lengthening the school day at lower grades, when students are
aged 12 to 15 years, reduces drug-related crimes (at least for the high school track).
The drop in drug-related crimes is mainly attributable to cannabis possession and no
effect on the cannabis dealing rate is present. Further survey evidence clearly links the
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decrease in cannabis consumption to G8 -affected students and rejects the hypothesis of
drug consumption shifted into school hours. In fact, the survey evidence even suggests
that cannabis consumption within the school decreases due to increased instructional
hours. Furthermore, the prevalence of cannabis within the peer group decreases after
the reform. The analysis of the student survey results indicate that the G8 reform has
stopped students from using cannabis or at least has delayed the starting age rather
than just reducing the consumption.
A direct analysis of the eliminated school year (old grade 13) on crime is not feasible
because this age (grade) level cannot be carefully identified within the underlying crime
data. In general, I cannot rule out that the decreased crime measures during school time
rise again during the eliminated school year, which is the first year after graduation.
However, the first cohorts of graduates that went through the new G8 reform system
do not show a tendency to catch-up with their drug consumption in the first years after
their school career. A catch-up effect of violent crime seems to be present for these
cohorts. Further analysis is necessary to identify the direct effect of the eliminated
school year.
The impact of lengthening the school day on substance abuse and crime 56
Appendix
Tables
Table 2.10: G8 reform impact on former students’ crime rate
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Drug-related Crime Rate
G8 dummy -0.267*** -0.267*** -0.012
after school (0.079) (0.088) (0.082)
Observations 1,376 1,286 1,286
R2 0.342 0.365 0.456
(B) Violent Crime Rate
G8 dummy 0.131*** 0.137*** 0.086**
after school (0.021) (0.023) (0.039)
Observations 1,440 1,344 1,344
R2 0.316 0.368 0.469
Land, Year, and
Age Group Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Police Expenditure No Yes Yes
(Youth) Unemployment No Yes Yes
Land Specific Time Trends No No Yes
Number of clusters 16 16 16
Notes: Based on PKS and administrative student data with the age groups from 10 to 22. Observation
period 1998 - 2012 for specification 1 and 1998 - 2011 for specification 2 and 3. Panel A looses
observation due to zero incidences of crimes related to dealing with cannabis in some La¨nder for a
few age groups in certain years. All specifications control for the absolute population in a given age
group. Standard errors are clustered on the Land level and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Definition: Severity of Dependence Scale SDS
1 Did you ever think your use of cannabis was out of control?
2 Did the prospect of missing cannabis make you very anxious or worried?
3 Did you worry about your use of cannabis?
4 Did you wish you could stop your use of cannabis?
5 How difficult would you find it to stop or go without cannabis?
• Responses:
– Item 1-4: never or almost never (0); sometimes(1); often (2); always or
nearly always (3)
– Item 5: not difficult (0); quite difficult (1), very difficult (2); impossible (3)
• The code from the responses are added and account for a cannabis addiction if
the value is at least 2 according to the definition of the SDS.
Chapter 3
Bunching on the Autobahn:
Speeding responses to a ‘notched’
penalty scheme
Co-authored with Christian Traxler & Ansgar Wohlschlegel
3.1 Introduction
Traditionally, microeconomics focuses on analyzing smooth incentive schemes. In real-
ity, however, agents often face regulations that imply non-linear or non-convex budget
sets, i.e., policies with ‘kinks’ or ‘notches’ (Kleven, 2016). While a quickly growing body
of research explores such kinks and notches in taxation,1 discontinuous policy schemes
are rarely studied beyond public finance. One important domain where notches are
ubiquitous is law enforcement. In many cases, fines and other penalties change discon-
tinuously with the ‘nuances’ of violation of law. Numerous laws specify, for instance,
that ‘minor’ fraud, theft, or tax evasion is punished differently than ‘major’ cases.
The differences between minor and major cases are often defined along given monetary
cutoffs (e.g., related to the damage; see Rasmusen, 1995). In a similar vein, sentenc-
ing guidelines often include discontinuous jumps at thresholds regarding the ‘offense
score’ or the ‘offender score’. Driving under the influence triggers a penalty that dis-
continuously increases at certain cutoff levels of blood alcohol content (Hansen, 2015).
1See, among many others, Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011), and Kleven and Waseem (2013).
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Similarly, this also applies for speeding, where penalties typically increase stepwise in
the speed level. The latter case forms the institutional context for our paper.
We analyze drivers’ responses to a penalty scheme in which penalties increase dis-
continuously at certain levels of speed above the respective limit. The core of our
study exploits detailed data on more than 150,000 speeding tickets recorded on the
German Autobahn. Like in many other countries, fines and other penalties jump dis-
continuously at several speed levels (e.g., 20, 25 or 30 km/h above the speed limit).
In Slemrod’s (2013) terminology, drivers thus face numerous ‘notches’ in the penalty
structure. To set the stage for our empirical analysis, we introduce a simple analytical
framework in the spirit of Kleven and Waseem (2013) and study the role of notches
on drivers’ optimal speed choices. The analysis shows under which conditions drivers
with heterogeneous tastes for speeding bunch at speed levels with notches.
Before we study the patterns of speed among the speeding tickets, we present
evidence from a survey which assesses whether German drivers understand the penalty
scheme’s structure. The survey reveals that the majority of respondents are very
knowledgeable about the scheme’s stepwise shape, its discontinuous jumps and the
location of the cutoffs. This finding is by no means trivial and – potentially due
to the simple structure of the penalty scheme – sets our results apart from studies
documenting limited knowledge (e.g., Chetty et al. 2013) and misperceptions of non-
linear or non-convex budget sets (e.g., De Bartolome, 1995; Liebman and Zeckhauser,
2004; Feldman et al., 2015).2
Consistent with the survey evidence and the predictions from our model, we find
evidence on bunching in the distribution of speeding tickets. A disproportionately
high fraction of drivers are speeding exactly at or slightly below several cutoffs of the
penalty scheme. Like in many tax applications (e.g., Bastani and Selin, 2014), however,
bunching varies considerably along the speed distribution. For very high levels of speed
(150km/h and higher), we do not detect any bunching. The observation is consistent
with drivers underestimating the detection risk and the fact that driving at very high
speed depletes cognitive capacities to optimally trade-off risks (Ja¨ncke et al., 2008).
In a further step, we analyze a reform of the penalty system which increased the size
of several notches (without changing the cutoffs). Our data indicate that speeders ra-
tionally responded to the reform by avoiding speed ranges which triggered significantly
higher penalties after the reform. Overall, the data suggest that the reform produced a
sizable shift in the speeding distribution, with a 25% drop in the fraction of cars driv-
2Further evidence is discussed in Chapter 2 in Congdon et al. (2011).
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ing more than 20km/h above the limit. Consistent with this observation, aggregate
statistics show a substantial drop in accidents and fatalities on German highways.
Our study relates to several strands of research. First, we contribute to the law
and economics of speeding and speed control.3 Given that each year around 1,000,000
lives are lost worldwide due to motor vehicle accidents (Peden et al., 2004) – with
speeding being a major contributor to the number of traffic fatalities – improving our
understanding of speed control policies is important. Several quasi-experimental stud-
ies document the impact of police enforcement (DeAngelo and Hansen, 2014), speed
limits (van Benthem, 2015) and speeding tickets (Dusek and Traxler, 2016) on travel
speed, accidents, fatalities and air pollution externalities. The present study differs
from these contributions since it analyzes drivers’ responses to the specific structure of
speeding penalties.
The results from our positive analysis also carry implications for the normative
debate on optimal speed limit enforcement and optimal penalties in general. At first,
one might argue that a notched penalty scheme entails welfare losses: given that the
externalities from speeding (accident risk, air and noise pollution, etc.) are continuously
increasing with the speed level, a stepwise penalty scheme does not correspond to an
efficient Pigouvian correction mechanism.4 In the context of boundedly rational or
imperfectly informed agents, however, the simplicity of the stepwise scheme might
increase awareness and contributes to the good knowledge of the penalty system – a
fact which is consistent with our survey evidence. Overall, the notched system could
therefore be superior to a more complex penalty function that is closer to a ‘true’
Pigouvian scheme, but poorly understood by drivers. A further point that speaks in
favor of the notched system directly relates to our bunching evidence: the fact that
many drivers speed at similar speed levels right below the cutoffs tends to reduce the
variance in speed. As a lower variance contributes to a reduction in the accident risk
(see, e.g., Lave, 1985), bunching might be good news in itself.
Finally, in terms of methods we are the first to employ the tools from the pub-
lic finance literature (e.g., Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven and Waseem 2013) to analyze
responses to notched penalty schemes in law enforcement.5 Our work therefore high-
lights a new field of applications for the bunching framework (Kleven, 2016). At the
3For early, theoretical contributions in this field see, e.g., Jondrow et al. (1983), Lavy (1985), and
Graves et al. (1993).
4For a related discussion, see Sallee and Slemrod (2012) and, for more formal treatments, Blinder
and Rosen (1985) and Gillitzer et al. (2016).
5A paper that is closely related to ours is the work by Sallee and Slemrod (2012), who study
automakers’ responses to notches in the taxation of cars.
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same time, our analysis clarifies several key differences between the law enforcement
and the taxation context. Most importantly, in our case, bunching is proportional to
expected notches – the discontinuous increase in penalties weighted with the detection
probability. Hence, there are two policy parameters which jointly determine the in-
centive to choose a corner solution: the jump in penalties at a given speed (analogous
to, e.g., increases in average tax rates at certain income levels) and the risk of punish-
ment. This latter dimension, which is not present in taxation studies but crucial if one
explores notches in law enforcement, impedes the translation of bunching mass into
behavioral response elasticities. The reason is that objective variation in law enforce-
ment and subjective priors about the detection risk (speed controls) essentially add an
additional layer of heterogeneity. Without common knowledge about the enforcement
risk (or subjective risk assessment data), notches in penalty schemes cannot readily be
used to identify behavioral elasticities.6
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institutional
framework for speeding in Germany. Section 3.3 presents evidence from our survey
on drivers’ knowledge of the penalty scheme’s structure. Section 3.4 introduces a
simple model of speeding and discusses several predictions. After presenting the data
(Section 3.5), we turn to the empirical analysis of the speeding tickets in Section 3.6.
The normative implications of our findings are discussed in the concluding Section 3.7.
3.2 Institutional Background
Despite common prejudices about German highways being the great dream of speeders,
there are speed limits on more than 85% of the 13,000 kilometers of Autobahn. Speed
limits are primarily imposed for safety reasons: high speed is the leading cause of
roughly 4,000 annual traffic deaths and 400,000 annual traffic injuries in Germany. On
the Autobahn, speeding is the chief cause for every second fatality.7
The enforcement of speed limits is based on permanently installed and on mobile
speed cameras which measure the speed of passing vehicles.8 For a speed above a certain
6A further, more technical difference to the taxation literature is related to the close proximity
of potential bunching points. In our context, it is reasonable to consider drivers who are indifferent
about speeding 20 or 25km/h above the limit. Our analysis therefore considers the joint influence of
multiple, potentially inter-related notches on behavior – a point which advances and generalizes the
theoretical bunching literature.
7Source: Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt.
8Mobile cameras are set-up by an officer for a few hours. In addition, on-board speed measurement
is carried out in unmarked cars.
Bunching on the Autobahn 62
level (see Section 3.5), a picture is automatically taken and the speed is recorded. Car
owners are identified from the number plates and receive a ticket by mail. Penalties
for speeding offenses – i.e., fines, ‘penalty points’ and possible driving bans – are a
function of the measured speed: the speed camera’s measure s is first rounded down to
the next integer; a tolerance value of 3% is subtracted and the result is again rounded
to the next lower integer.9 The outcome from this so-called ‘tolerance rule’ (which
serves as a concession to prevent appeals against speeding tickets), the speed level x,
determines the penalty according to Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Penalties for speeding at German Autobahn
Speed bracket Cutoff Fines (in euro) Penalty Driving
(speed above limit in km/h) pre-reform post-reform change Points Ban
xi f
pre
i ∆
pre
i f
post
i ∆
post
i
∆post−∆pre
∆pre
(Months)
x ≤ 10 10 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.00 0 –
10 < x ≤ 15 15 20.0 10.0 20.0 10.0 0.00 0 –
15 < x ≤ 20 20 30.0 33.5 30.0 63.5 0.90 0 –
20 < x ≤ 25 25 63.5 10.0 93.5 10.0 0.00 1 –
25 < x ≤ 30 30 73.5 15.0 103.5 40.0 1.67 3 (1)
30 < x ≤ 40 40 98.5 25.0 143.5 40.0 0.60 3 (1)
40 < x ≤ 50 50 123.5 50.0 183.5 80.0 0.60 3 1
50 < x ≤ 60 60 173.5 125.0 263.5 200.0 0.60 4 1
60 < x ≤ 70 70 298.5 100.0 463.5 160.0 0.60 4 2
70 < x ≤ 70 − 398.5 − 623.5 − − 4 3
Notes: The table presents the fines (fi) and other penalties (penalty points and temporary driving
bans) for different speed levels over the speed limit on the German Autobahn. The columns labeled
by ∆pre and ∆post capture the pre-/post-reform notches in the fines, respectively (i.e., the increase in
the fine associated with moving from a ‘lower’ to a ‘higher’ speed bracket). The duration of temporary
driving bans indicated brackets are only imposed the second time a driver is detected speeding by
more than 25 km/h within one year.
Monetary fines range from 10 to 623.50 euro. The fines discontinuously increase at
cutoffs of x being, e.g., 20, 25, 30 or 40 km/h above the speed limit. Within each speed
bracket, i.e., between two cutoffs, the fine is constant. The same holds for temporary
driving bans: a one-, two- or three-month ban is imposed for speeding in the range
40–60, 60–70, and more than 70 km/h above the limit, respectively. The penalty
9Consider the following example: a speed camera measures s = 140.6km/h. The recorded speed
is first rounded down to 140km/h. Thereafter, it is reduced by 3% to 135.8km/h and further rounded
down to x = 135km/h.
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point scheme follows a stepwise pattern, too. Speeding in the range 20–25, 25–50, or
above 50 km/h results in one, two or three penalty points, respectively. The repeated
accumulation of points, which are recorded in a register of traffic offenders, can result
in the revocation of a driver’s license.10
In 2009 there was a significant reform of the penalty schedule. Starting with Febru-
ary 2009, fines for speeding with more than 20 km/h above the limit were increased
considerably. All other penalties (points and driving bans) remained unchanged. An
overview of the fines before and after the reform as well as the stable components of
the penalty system is provided in Table 3.1.
The table illustrates the key property of the penalty system: the penalty scheme
is characterized by what the Public Finance literature calls ‘notches’ (Slemrod, 2013):
discontinuous increases in fines, penalty points and/or driving bans at each speed
bracket’s cutoff.11 Before 2009, speeding with e.g. 20km/h above the limit triggered a
fine of 30 euro and no penalty point; for 21km/h, it was 63.50 euro and one penalty
point. The table further shows that the reform not only increased the level of the
fines but also the magnitude of several notches. At the 20km/h cutoff, for instance,
the increase in the fine amounted to 33.50 euro before (∆pre) but 63.50 euro after the
reform (∆post). The notch (in the fine level) thus increased by 90 percent. Similar
increases occurred at other cutoffs.
3.3 Survey Evidence
Let us first study whether the simplicity of the stepwise penalty structure is reflected
in a good knowledge of the penalty scheme. To approach this question, we conducted
an online survey. The survey was implemented in June 2013 in cooperation with a
professional survey company which maintains a large sample of German individuals
that is representative in several dimensions (age, gender, education and occupational
structure). We invited a random subset of this sample (conditional on having a driver’s
license) to participate in the survey. Summary statistics for the approximately 1,000
10Offenders who have accumulated between 14 and 17 points are obliged to participate in a costly
seminar on traffic safety. Drivers that end up at 18 or more points get their driver’s license revoked.
Older points are deleted two years after collecting them if no additional tickets were issued since then.
For a theoretical analysis of combining monetary fines with penalty points, see Bourgeon and Picard
(2007).
11Notched penalty structures can be found in many other countries. For evidence from Italy, Spain,
and the Czech Republic, see De Paola et al. (2013), Castillo-Manzano et al. (2010) and Montag (2014),
respectively.
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participants are provided in Table 3.2. 48% of the respondents were male and the
average age was 43 years. 54% drive a car every day and more than 60% drive on the
Autobahn several times a month. More than a third of the respondents have experience
with the penalty system: 28% report that they were caught speeding during the last
two years and 12% indicate that they hold a positive penalty point record in the register
of traffic offenders (see above).
Table 3.2: Summary statistics – survey data
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Age (in years) 43.324 13.986
Male 0.477 0.501
Drive car every day 0.541 0.499
Drive on Autobahn regularly 0.616 0.487
Speeding ticket within last 2 years∗ 0.275 0.447
Penalty point record∗ 0.122 0.327
Aware of tolerance rule 0.933 0.251
Speed at slightly below threshold∗ 0.848 0.359
Survey duration (minutes) 5.593 3.362
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the online survey. The number of observations is
N = 980. ∗ indicates variables which are only available for sub-samples.
To elicit people’s knowledge about the penalty system, we first asked survey par-
ticipants to indicate the level of speeding fines for a randomly drawn sequence of speed
levels (see the Supplementary Appendix for further details). We thereby obtained in-
formation on the expected fines as a function of the speed without mentioning the
stepwise fine structure in the question. Figure 3.1 illustrates the results. The blue dots
indicate the median expected fines (together with the 33rd- and 66th-percentile) for the
surveyed levels of speeding. The dashed red (dotted green) line shows the actual fine
for the post- (pre-) reform period. The figure provides two insights. First, respondents
reveal a good knowledge of the stepwise structure and the increase of fines at the cut-
offs.12 While there is no jump in the median response at the 30/31 threshold, the lower
and top terciles (as well as the average, not depicted) strongly increase at the cutoff.
Second, the expected level of the speeding fines is much closer to the pre-reform level.
12The average survey duration was 6 minutes, suggesting that responses do not stem from ad-hoc
online research on the questions.
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A possible interpretation of this latter finding is that drivers’ expectations converge
only slowly to the post-reform levels.
Figure 3.1: Expected and actual fines (in Euro) for a given speed above the limit.
Note: The figure illustrates survey responses regarding the expected fines (in euro, vertical axis) for
a given speed above the limit (in km/h, horizontal axis). The blue dots capture median expectation,
the upper and lower ‘bounds’ on the blue dots indicate the 33rd- and 66th-percentile, respectively.
The dashed red lines and the green dotted line depict the fines for the post- and pre-reform period,
respectively.
The good understanding of the stepwise shape of the penalty function is further
captured in the responses to subsequent questions which explicitly asked whether there
is an increase in penalties at certain speed levels. For each of the five surveyed thresh-
olds, the mode of the response distribution (typically accounting for half of all answers)
overlaps with the true cutoff (see the Supplementary Appendix). This corroborates the
first finding from above. We also asked whether drivers know about the ‘tolerance rule’
for computing the speed level which is relevant for determining the penalty (compare
Section 3.2). 93% answered that they were aware of this rule. Among them, 36% –
again the mode of the response distribution – indicated the correct rule. Hence, there
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is quite some variation in the expectations regarding the tolerance rule, but one out of
three drivers seems to know the rule.
Overall, the survey evidence indicates that the simplicity of the penalty scheme is
indeed reflected in a good understanding of the system: the majority of respondents
understand very well the scheme’s stepwise shape with its discontinuous changes at
cutoffs. This finding is by no means trivial and – potentially due to the simplicity of
the penalty structure – sets it apart from a growing body of evidence for individuals’
limited knowledge and misperception of non-linear budget sets (e.g., De Bartolome,
1995; Liebman and Zeckhauser; 2004, Chetty et al. 2013; Feldman et al., 2015). The
good understanding of the notches observed in our set-up suggests that drivers should
respond to the penalty structure. In fact, we asked participants if they would speed
on highways and, if at all, whether they would try to avoid higher fines by staying
under a certain cutoff. Among those that admitted speeding (almost three of four
respondents), 85% indicated they would drive at a speed level slightly below one of the
cutoffs in the penalty scheme. Before studying whether we indeed observe this pattern,
we now analyze individuals’ speeding choices theoretically.
3.4 Theoretical Framework
To set the stage for our empirical analysis, we analyze a risk neutral driver’s optimal
speeding response to a stepwise penalty scheme. Let the monetary equivalent of the net
benefits from a given speed x (time spent on the trip, net of costs for fuel consumption,
experienced ‘pleasure’ from driving at speed x, etc.) be given by a twice differentiable
function v(x, θ), where the parameter θ captures heterogeneous preferences. Drivers’
types θ are distributed continuously with density g(θ) and the c.d.f. G(θ). For every
type θ, v(., θ) is concave in x and satisfies the single-crossing property, i.e. ∂
2v(x,θ)
∂x2
< 0
and ∂
2v(x,θ)
∂x∂θ
> 0 ∀x, θ.13 With probability p, the driver’s speed is measured by a speed
camera. In this case he may get a penalty f(x) which is a step function of the observed
speed x:
13For a less stylized model of speeding choices (in which, however, drivers’ preferences are homo-
geneous) see Jondrow et al. (1983).
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f(x) =

f0 = 0, if x ≤ x0, with x0 capturing the speed limit;
...
fi, if xi−1 < x ≤ xi,
...
fI , if xI−1 < x,
(1)
with xi denoting the cutoff for speed bracket i = 1, . . . , I, and fi expressing the costs of
the penalties for a given speeding bracket i.14 A notch at a cutoff speed xi is given by
∆i := fi+1− fi > 0. Assuming that the drivers’ utility functions are quasi-linear, their
objective functions are given by the net benefits from driving v(x, θ) and the expected
penalties f(x):15
max
x
EU(x, θ) = v(x, θ)− pf(x). (2)
As f(.) is a step function which is ‘flat’ between the different cutoffs xi, the first-order
condition for an interior optimum x∗ is
∂v(x∗; θ)
∂x
= 0. (3)
With the additive separable utility function, the interior option is independent of the
enforcement parameters. x∗ is thus equal to the driver’s optimal speeding decision
absent of any penalty scheme. Our assumptions on v(.) further imply that x∗ = x∗(θ)
is a continuously increasing function of θ.
While the interior solution does not depend on the penalty, the stepwise shape of
f(x) gives rise to possible corner solutions. Figure 3.2 illustrates this point graphi-
cally, plotting x on the horizontal and expected utility (EU) on the vertical axis. The
stepwise penalty scheme implies that the inverted-U shape of expected utility discon-
tinuously drops at each cutoff xi (in the graph: x1 and x2). At these speed levels the
penalty increases (∆i > 0) and, consequentially, the expected utility decreases. As
illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3.2, a notch does not necessarily imply a corner
solution. Only if the expected notch, p∆i, is sufficiently large (for a given driver θ),
the driver’s optimal speed corresponds to a corner solution at a cutoff. This case is
depicted in the right panel of the figure.
14As the penalty may include non-monetary components (e.g., a driving ban or penalty points),
f(x) denotes the average present value of the monetary equivalent of the penalty. Allowing for
heterogeneity in the penalty across different drivers would complicate the following discussion without
yielding additional insights.
15Risk aversion would not affect our analysis as long as cross derivatives of Bernoulli utility functions
with respect to the net benefits of driving and penalties are zero. If they are not, a driver’s interior
optimum x∗ would depend on her type and the size of the penalty.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal speed level with notches: Interior optimum and corner solution
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Note: The figure displays the mapping of speed x into expected utility, EU , for a given θ-type and
notches at two cutoffs, x1 and x2. For the case depicted in the left panel, the expected notch is small
and the driver’s optimal speed corresponds to the interior solution. In the right panel, the expected
notch at x1 is larger, thus turning this cutoff into the driver’s optimal speed level.
3.4.1 Responses to Notches
To study the impact of a penalty scheme with notches more formally, we follow the
theoretical analysis in Kleven and Waseem (2013). Note first that, absent of any
penalties, the function x∗(θ) would simply map types of drivers into speed choices.
The observed distribution of speed, H(x), would be continuous. In the presence of
notches this will generally not be the case. This point is illustrated in Figure 3.3,
which plots expected utility for two types who face a notch at xi. The interior solution
for the driver of type θi exactly corresponds to the cutoff, x
∗(θi) = xi, i.e., he would
choose the cutoff xi even absent any penalty scheme. Drivers with slightly higher θ
are strictly better off when choosing their corner solution xi rather than their interior
solution x∗(θ) > xi which would trigger a penalty fi+1 > fi. In contrast, the driver
with θi is indifferent between his interior solution, x
∗(θi) > xi and the corner solution
at xi. For the case depicted in Figure 3.3, all types above θi and below θi strictly
prefer the corner solution xi over any speed x > xi. The set of drivers who bunch at
the cutoff xi is thus given by the type interval [θi, θi]. The following Lemma generalizes
this observation for a penalty scheme with more than one notch:16
16All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.3: Bunching at notch xi.
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Note: The figure displays the mapping of speed x into expected utility for heterogenous θ-types and
one notch at the cutoff xi. For the driver with type θ = θi, the corner solution at the cutoff is identical
to her interior solution. The driver with θ = θi is indifferent between her the interior solution x
∗(θi)
and the corner solution at xi. All drivers with θi < θ < θi will prefer the speed xi over their interior
optimum x∗(θ).
Lemma 1 Consider a notch ∆i > 0 at speed cutoff xi that is used by a non-empty set
of types. The probability mass of drivers speeding at xi is given by Πi = G(θi)−G(θi),
where θi satisfies either
x∗(θi) = xi (4)
or ∃j < i : v(xi, θi)− v(xj, θi) = p(fi − fj), (5)
and θi satisfies either
∃j > i : v(x∗(θi), θi)− v(xi, θi) = p(fj − fi) and xj−1 < x∗(θi) < xj, (6)
or ∃j > i : v(xj, θi)− v(xi, θi) = p(fj − fi). (7)
Lemma 1 shows that there could be different characterizations of the boundaries
of the interval [θi, θi]. In Figure 3.3, the boundaries are characterized by (4) and (6)
(with j = i+ 1). In the case of multiple notches, however, the lower bound could also
be given by (5). For this case, the type with θi would be indifferent between a corner
solution at xi and a cutoff at a lower speed bracket, xj < xi. Similarly, the upper
bound could be characterized by (7), which describes a type who is indifferent between
a corner solution at xi and a corner solution at a cutoff for a higher speed bracket,
xj > xi.
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The key implication from Lemma 1 is that notches may push drivers into corner
solutions. Empirically, we should thus observe bunching of drivers at a speed level
equal to a cutoff, x = xi, and a sparsely populated (or even empty) range of speed
levels slightly above a cutoff. The latter ‘density holes’ in H(x) stem from drivers in
the interval [θi, θi] who would, in the absence of law enforcement (for p = 0), choose
a speed in the range x∗(θi) < xi < x
∗(θi). We will discuss the sensitivity of these
predictions below.
3.4.2 Responses to the Reform
To assess the impact of the 2009 reform on speeding, let us first consider a simple,
hypothetical reform: an increase in fh by a constant amount for all speed brackets
h > `. Such a reform increases ∆` at cutoff x` but leaves all other notches unaffected.
All speed levels x > x` become less attractive and drivers will choose a weakly slower
speed. In terms of the distribution H(x), some mass of drivers located above x` before
the reform will be shifted towards lower speed levels.
Lemma 2 Consider a reform that increases one notch ∆` and leaves all other ∆j,
j 6= ` unchanged. Then every driver will drive weakly slower after the change.
The hypothetical reform will also affect bunching. On the one hand, some types of
drivers with an interior optimum x∗(θ) > x` before the reform will start to bunch at
cutoff x` (or a ‘lower’ cutoff xl, l < `). Hence, bunching at x` (and lower cutoffs) tends
to increase. On the other hand, driver types who were initially bunching at a cutoff xh,
h > `, will find it more attractive to drive slower. Bunching at xh will then decrease.
Proposition 1 Consider a reform that increases one notch ∆` and leaves all other
∆j, j 6= ` unchanged. The probability mass Πi of drivers that bunch at a given cutoff
xi will then
(i) weakly decrease if i > `, and (ii) weakly increase if i ≤ `.
In a nutshell, Proposition 1 shows that bunching at a given cutoff xi increases in
the size of a notch above this cutoff. Vice versa, bunching at xi decreases if a notch at
a lower speed cutoff increases. Obviously, the reform described in Table 3.1 differs from
our hypothetical case. The 2009 reform was characterized by an increase of the notch
at 20km/h above the limit and of all notches at 30km/h and above. The logic behind
Proposition 1 thus predicts an increase in bunching at the 20km/h cutoff (and at all
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lower cutoffs) after the reform. For all other cutoffs, however, the impact of the reform
is ambiguous. To see this point, consider the 30km/h cutoff, which experienced the
largest increase of the notch. The larger notch at 30km/h (and the increase of ‘higher’
notches) tends to induce more bunching at this cutoff, whereas the increase of the notch
at 20km/h works in the opposite direction. Without further assumptions, the overall
effect on the bunching mass at the 30km/h cutoff is therefore unclear. Independently
of the bunching, however, our analysis suggests that the reform should result in weakly
slower speed levels (see Lemma 2).
3.4.3 Discussion
The analysis from Section 3.4.1 suggests that we should expect bunching at cutoffs
together with density holes in the speed range above a cutoff. There are, however,
several arguments why this might not be borne out by the data. The most important
arguments are based on the difficulties in targeting a specific cutoff xi. First, there is
substantial variation in the speed indicated by speedometers of different automobiles.
Hence, a driver who observes a speed of, for instance, 130km/h on the car’s speedometer
will most likely not drive x = 130km/h.17 This also means that cruise controls (which
are fairly uncommon in Germany) do not necessarily facilitate the targeting of cutoffs.
Second, our notation indicates that we model the drivers’ choice over a penalty-
relevant speed x, i.e., the actual speed after applying the tolerance rule (see Sec-
tion 3.2). Choosing a speed which corresponds to a cutoff xi thus requires drivers to
correctly compute the way in which the tolerance rule maps the measured speed s into
the penalty-relevant speed x. While the survey evidence suggests that roughly every
third driver exactly knows the tolerance rule, two thirds either over- or underestimate
the rule’s generosity. As a result there might be a significant amount of optimization
errors – which are, presumably, more frequent than in the context of tax notches (see
Chetty, 2012; Kleven and Waseem, 2013). These errors will work against bunching and
will diminish any density holes.
A further and important reason why we might not see much bunching is based on
the possibility that drivers – particularly those who choose to drive above the speed
limit – underestimate the risk of a speed control. This derives from the fact that,
17The European Council Directive 75/443/EEC and §57(2) of the German Straßenverkehrs-
Zulassungsordnung allows a tolerance in the speed displayed by speedometer of up to 13% above
the true speed level (for the relevant speed range studied below). An indicated speed of 130km/h
could therefore correspond to an actual speed of only 115km/h.
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cet. par., bunching will be proportional to the expected notch, p∆i. The lower the
drivers’ prior about the probability p, the more likely they are to choose their interior
optima. If most speeders are driving above the speed limit because they underestimate
the detection risk, we should therefore observe no bunching. However, if there is a
second type of speeders who drive above the limit despite a (sufficiently) high prior
about p, these types will be bunching. In combination, heterogeneous priors might
produce bunching without any pronounced density holes.
Related to the individuals’ risk assessments, there is evidence from neuroscience
suggesting that drivers display a diminished control of risk-taking behavior at higher
speed levels – when the control of the car requires more cognitive resources (Ja¨ncke et
al., 2008). In our context this would imply that drivers are more likely to act ‘as if
p ≈ 0’ at a higher speed. As a consequence, we should observe less bunching at higher
speed bracket cutoffs. Our rational choice model would yield an equivalent prediction,
if the ‘taste for speeding’ (captured by the curvature of v(x, θ)) would become more
‘sharp’ for high values of θ (as reflected in ∂3v(x, θ)/∂x2∂θ). We will return to these
arguments below.
A last point worth discussing is the fact that our analysis – in contrast to the
taxation literature (e.g., Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven and Waseem, 2013)
– does not link the bunching mass to the elasticity of speeders with respect to the
fine. There are two important reasons for not performing such an analysis. First,
agents respond to two dimensions of policy: the penalty scheme (reflected in f(x)) and
the detection probability p. While information on the scheme are available to drivers
(just like the tax rates and thresholds are, in principle, observable for taxpayers),
probabilities are largely unknown. In the context of heterogeneous priors one would
then need very strong assumptions to identify the relevant elasticity.18 Second, the type
range of drivers who bunch in our context might be given by equations (5) and (7) from
Lemma 1 – a case which is neglected in tax studies, because tax thresholds are typically
located in quite different (e.g., income) ranges. Our set-up, however, is characterized
by many ‘closely’ located notches. Technically, we would need to identify both the
highest and the lowest types of drivers bunching at a given notch, which implies one
additional identification requirement.
18Note further that the elasticities which derive from bunching estimates are sensitive to the spe-
cific functional form of preferences. While recent taxation research is characterized by an (implicit)
consensus about the ‘right’ utility function, we are not aware of any consensus on drivers’ preferences
over speeding and monetary well-being.
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3.5 Data
To empirically evaluate speeding behavior, we use data from a highway police unit
which is responsible for monitoring 575 kilometers of Autobahn in the state of North
Rhine-Westphalia. The police unit provided us with information on all tickets that
emerged from speed controls with mobile cameras on stretches of the Autobahn with a
speed limit of 100km/h during the period 01/2005 to 12/2006 and 01/2009 to 03/2010.
The data cover 154,970 speeding tickets with an overall amount of 10.85m Euros in
fines. For each ticket we observe the penalty-relevant speed x in integer values (i.e., the
outcome from applying the tolerance rule discussed in Section 3.2), the precise date,
time and location of the speed measurement as well as the weather (sunny, cloudy,
rainy) and street conditions (dry, damp, wet). For a subset of the tickets, we also
observe the driver’s gender and several digits of the car’s license plate. The latter
information allows us to identify local drivers.19
Table 3.3, which provides summary statistics on our data, indicates that around
70% of the observations come from the pre-reform period. The data cover speeding
tickets from all days of the week, with fewer tickets on weekends and slightly more on
Wednesdays. More than 40% of the speeding offenses were recorded in the morning
(8am–12am), around 25% in the evening (4pm–8pm) and less than 5% at night (8pm–
12pm). For the sub-sample of tickets with richer information we find that around 80%
of speeders are male and roughly 20–30% are locals.
The data further reveal that not every speed measurement with x > 100km/h
resulted in a ticket. In 86% of all speed control sessions (covering 83% of all speeding
tickets), the police only recorded and enforced speeding offenses with x ≥ 116km/h.20
Hence, we only observe the truncated distribution of penalty-relevant speed measures.
Among these measures, the average speed x is 125.11 km/h, with a slightly lower speed
in the post- as compared to the pre-reform period – an observation that we will explore
in more detail below. Finally, the average fine is 63.82 euro in the pre-reform sample.
After the reform, this value increases by 35% to 86.29 euro.
19A driver is coded as local if the Kreis (county) indicated by the license plate corresponds to the
‘home’ or a neighboring Kreis of the location of the speed measurement.
20This practice is a response to the administrative costs of issuing and enforcing a ticket. These
costs make speeding tickets which include only small fines economically unattractive. Our data also
show, however, that the police sometimes enforce minor speeding violations (starting with 106km/h).
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics – speeding tickets
Pooled data Pre-reform Post-reform
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Speeding x 125.11 (9.20) 125.16 (9.04) 124.99 (9.60)
Monetary fine f 70.23 (49.72) 63.82 (39.01) 86.29 (67.02)
Enforcement limit:
= 116km/h 0.83 (0.38) 0.82 (0.39) 0.86 (0.35)
= 121km/h 0.10 (0.30) 0.12 (0.33) 0.03 (0.18)
Male Drivers∗ 0.83 (0.37) 0.84 (0.36) 0.80 (0.40)
Local Drivers∗ 0.27 (0.44) 0.32 (0.47) 0.17 (0.37)
12:00 am – 7:59 am 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.03)
8:00 am – 11:59 am 0.43 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.38 (0.48)
12:00 pm – 3:59 pm 0.28 (0.45) 0.24 (0.43) 0.36 (0.48)
4:00 pm – 7:59 pm 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.21 (0.40)
8:00 pm – 11:59 pm 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.24)
January 0.09 (0.28) 0.11 (0.31) 0.04 (0.19)
February 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.24) 0.11 (0.31)
March 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.32)
April 0.09 (0.28) 0.07 (0.26) 0.13 (0.33)
May 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.31) 0.12 (0.32)
June 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25) 0.11 (0.31)
July 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27) 0.06 (0.24)
August 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.26)
September 0.11 (0.31) 0.12 (0.33) 0.07 (0.25)
October 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31) 0.06 (0.24)
November 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23)
December 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.25)
Monday 0.16 (0.37) 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36)
Tuesday 0.15 (0.36) 0.16 (0.37) 0.12 (0.32)
Wednesday 0.21 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42)
Thursday 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36) 0.16 (0.37)
Friday 0.14 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.15 (0.35)
Saturday 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.29)
Sunday 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31)
Number of:
speeding tickets 154,970 110,721 44,249
speed control sessions 1,139 843 296
Notes: The table presents summary statistics – sample means and standard deviations in parenthesis
– on the speeding tickets from the pooled, the pre- and the post-reform sample. ∗ indicates that the
variable is only recorded in a sub-sample of tickets. The small share of observations in post-reform
January is due to the fact that the reform was introduced on 1 February 2009.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Descriptive Evidence
We start out by examining whether the distribution of x among the speeding tickets
provides any evidence for bunching at the cutoffs of the penalty scheme. Figure 3.4(a)
illustrates the density distribution of the penalty-relevant speed x among the pooled
sample of all speeding tickets with x ≥ 116 relative to the total population of roughly
6 mio. measured drivers. The dashed green lines indicate the cutoffs from the penalty
function (see Table 3.1). The density distribution is decreasing in the speed level and
displays several major spikes. Two of these spikes are located right at cutoffs (120 and
125km/h), and one is located slightly below a cutoff (129 km/h). The figure does not
show any pronounced density holes ‘to the right’ of the spikes – a point that we will
return to below. For speed levels with x ≤ 122, we observe a lot of variation in the
density distribution.21 This makes it hard to evaluate the spike at the lowest cutoff
(120 km/h). While it is more clear that there is no visible evidence for bunching at
higher speed cutoffs (140, 150 and 160km/h), the distribution shows several drops,
some of which overlap with the cutoffs.
Recall that our data capture the penalty-relevant speed x after applying the toler-
ance rule (see above). Note further that the way in which the tolerance rule transforms
the measured speed s into the penalty-relevant speed x mechanically produces a con-
centration of tickets at some values of x. In particular, all measures with 133 ≤ s < 135
[166 ≤ s < 168] will be recorded with x = 129 [x = 161] in our data. Hence, the spike
at x = 129 [and at x = 161] which is illustrated in Figure 3.4(a) might be a result of
the tolerance rule’s non-injective mapping of s into x.22
To account for this mechanical effect, we empirically ‘revert’ the mapping. For each
value of x which maps one-to-one into s, we first assign the correct speed measured s
(in integer values). Omitting the values for s = {133, 134, 166, 167} we then estimate a
higher-order polynomial function that approximates the observed distribution of speed
tickets over s. Based on the estimated distribution we finally assign the density mass
21We discussed this observation with the police unit which provided us with the data. While we
could not identify any plausible explanation for the variation in the density for speed x ≤ 122, we
can reject the hypotheses that the variation is induced by different measurement techniques, rounding
issues, or by overlapping enforcement thresholds.
22To illustrate the problem, note that for any 133 ≤ s < 135 the tolerance rule – rounding down,
subtracting 3% of the speed and rounding down again – will transform s into x = 129. For 135 ≤
x ≤ 165, however, the tolerance rule is bijective, mapping one value of measured speed s into one
observed value of x.
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Figure 3.4: Density distribution of speed
(a) Observed distribution of penalty-relevant speed x
(b) Projected distribution of measured speed s
Notes: The figure illustrates the observed distribution of the penalty-relevant speed x (Panel a) as
well as the projected distribution of measured speed s (Panel b) among all tickets (pooling data from
the pre- and post-reform period). The vertical axes indicates the fraction of tickets observed for a
given speed level, relative to the total number of speed measures. The horizontal axes capture the
penalty-relevant speed x (Panel a) and the measured speed s (Panel b), respectively. The speed limit
is 100km/h. The dashed green lines indicate the cutoffs xi from the penalty function (Panel a); the
dashed red lines (Panel b) express these cutoffs in terms of the measured speed s.
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from x = {129} [x = {161}] to the speed levels s = {133, 134} [s = {166, 167}]. The
resulting distribution is presented in Figure 3.4(b). The figure shows that the massive
spike at x = 129 from Figure 3.4(a) considerably shrinks once we account for the
rounding rule. Nevertheless, the projected distribution includes a significant heap at
s = {133, 134} (corresponding to x = 129).23 Hence, the spike below the 130km/h
cutoff is only partially due to the rounding rule.
3.6.2 Estimation Approach
To estimate the bunching mass at a cutoff xi, we start from the empirically observed
mass of tickets within the range [s(xi) − δ; s(xi)], where s(xi) indicates a cutoff from
the penalty scheme (in terms of measured speed s) and δ ≥ 0 defines the bunching area
below the cutoff (in integer km/h values of measured speed). Following the taxation
literature, we then assess this mass of speeders relative to the expected mass from a
counterfactual distribution for the hypothetical case without a notched penalty scheme.
To obtain the counterfactual we approximate the speed ticket distribution from
Figure 3.4.b by a polynomial function. More specifically, we estimate
Cs =
q¯∑
q=0
βq s
q +
s(xi)∑
r=(s(xi)−δ)
γr · I[s = r] + s (8)
where Cs indicates the share of drivers measured with speed s, q¯ defines the order of
the polynomial function, and I is the indicator function. Based on the estimated β-
coefficients (but excluding the γ-coefficients) we then predict Cˆproxs =
∑q¯
q=0 βˆq s
q. This
initial proxy for the counterfactual distribution neglects the excess mass of speeders
from the range [s(xi)−δ; s(xi)] who would, in the absence of a notched penalty scheme,
choose a speed level ‘to the right’ of the cutoff s(xi). To account for this fact, Cˆ
prox
s is
inflated for speed values s > s(xi), up to the point where the counterfactual distribution
of Cˆs satisfies the integration constraint,
∑
Cˆs =
∑
Cs (i.e., when the empirical and the
counterfactual distribution cover an equal number of speeding tickets). The bunching
23Note that our approach assumes that the distribution of the observations from one speed level
x among the two speed levels in s follows the estimated, ‘smoothed’ distribution. Hence, the pro-
jection ignores that rational drivers could anticipate the property of the tolerance rule and locate
predominantly at the higher of the two speed levels s. If drivers indeed behave like this, the ‘excess
mass’ would concentrate on s = 134. The following analysis will account for the fact that we cannot
determine the precise speed measure for the two pairs of s.
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mass bˆi in the speed range [s(xi)− δ; s(xi)] is then given by
bˆi =
s(xi)∑
s=(s(xi)−δ)
Cs − Cˆs
Cˆs/(1 + δ)
. (9)
bˆi indicates the excess mass, i.e., the difference between the observed and the predicted
speed tickets with s(xi) − δ ≤ s ≤ s(xi) (in the numerator) relative to the average
mass in the counterfactual distribution for this range (denominator). We estimate bˆi
together with boot-strapped standard errors using the iterative procedure from Chetty
et al. (2011).
Several aspects of our approach deserve a closer discussion. Note first that we base
our estimates on the projected distribution of speed s rather than the distribution
of penalty-relevant speed values x. By doing so, and by accordingly adjusting δ, we
avoid potential problems with the rounding rule. Second, we will report bunching
estimates that locally approximate the counterfactual distribution for the speed range
around each cutoff. Our results remain qualitatively unaffected when we estimate one
counterfactual for the full range of s. The same holds true when we estimate bunching
using simpler approximations (e.g., in the spirit of Saez, 2010).
Last, the estimation of (8) accounts for the observations from the bunching area
[s(xi)−δ; s(xi)] but not for those in the range ‘to the right’ of a cutoff, with a potential
missing mass in the distribution (compare Kleven and Waseem, 2013). This approach,
which is closer to a ‘kink’- rather than a ‘notch-bunching’ analysis, is motivated by
the fact that we face a high number of nearby notches with only few (integer valued)
observations between two notches. This prevents us from jointly estimating a bunching
and a missing-mass area (as in Kleven and Waseem, 2013). Moreover, we do not
observe any pronounced density holes (see Figure 3.4). Note further, that we will not
use the bunching mass estimates to compute a proxy for a behavioral elasticity (see
the discussion in Section 3.4.3).
3.6.3 Bunching Estimates
Figure 3.5(a) and (b) present the results from bunching estimates for the cutoffs with
25 and 30km/h above the limit, respectively. For the moment, we pool the data for the
pre- and post-reform period. Figure 3.5(a) shows sharp bunching right at the cutoff
s(xi) = 129. The estimated bunching coefficient for the range s = {128, 129} (i.e., at
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xi = 125 with δ = 1) indicates an economically and statistically significant excess mass
of 36% (relative to the average counterfactual mass in that speed range). Figure 3.5(b),
which presents the estimate for the cutoff at s(xi) = 135, illustrates an excess mass
which is located at least one km/h below the cutoff. To account for the fact that we
cannot distinguish the measured speed for s = 133 and s = 134 (see Section 3.6.1),
we estimate bunching in the broader range s = {133, 134, 135} (i.e., we set δ = 2 for
xi = 130).
24 Just like for the first cutoff, we obtain a significant bunching mass of 42%.
What about bunching at the other cutoffs of the penalty scheme? Recall first that
the majority of the speeding tickets are based on violations with x ≥ 116. Hence,
we cannot study bunching at the first two cutoffs, at 110 and 115km/h. As discussed
above, there is a sizeable spike together with a substantial amount of unexplained
variation in the distribution of tickets around the cutoff at xi = 120km/h (compare
Figure 3.4). Our method to quantify bunching thus yields a positive but imprecisely
estimated coefficient for this cutoff (see Table 3.4).
Consistent with the graphical analysis from above, we do not detect any evidence
on bunching for cutoffs at higher speed levels (see Table 3.4).25 The null-results for
these high speed cutoffs – which would correspond to an actually measured speed of
s = 145, 155 and 165km/h, respectively – are consistent with the evidence showing
that drivers tend to make less deliberate choices when they drive at very high do
speed: their cognitive capacities are depleted which in turn reduces the capacity to
optimally trade-off risks (Ja¨ncke et al., 2008). Two alternative explanations might be
that rational drivers, who drive 40 and more above a speed limit of 100km/h, either
have a very sharp ‘taste for speeding’ (as captured by ∂3v(x, θ)/∂x2∂θ > 0) or they
expect a very low detection risk p. In either case, they would be fairly insensitive to
the notches in the penalty scheme.
24With δ = 2, the estimated coefficient is insensitive to how the projection allocates speed tickets
from x = 129 to s = 133 and s = 134 (see Section 3.6.2).
25For the cutoff at xi = 140km/h, we estimate a significantly negative value for bˆi. Note, however,
that we observe a fairly small number of tickets together with a substantial variance in their distri-
bution in this speed range. It is therefore not surprising that for high speed values the estimates for
bˆi are sensitive to the choice of the polynomial degree.
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Figure 3.5: Empirical and counterfactual distribution of speeding levels
(a) Bunching estimation at the 125km/h cutoff
(b) Bunching estimation at the 130km/h cutoff
Note: Empirical and counterfactual distribution of measured speeding for a speed limit of 100km/h
from pre- and post-reform data (pooled). The counterfactual distributions for graphs (a) and (b) are
based on a linear (i.e., q¯ = 1) and a quadratic fit (q¯ = 2 for s(xi) = 135), respectively. The horizontal
axes indicates the empirical speed above the limit. The vertical axes indicates the percentage share of
observations for each speed level (relative to all measured drivers). The red dashed vertical line in the
top graph indicates the speed s = 129km/h (corresponding to a penalty-relevant speed x = 125km/h).
The red dashed vertical line in the bottom graph indicates the speed of s = 135km/h (corresponding
to x = 130km/h).
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Table 3.4: Bunching estimates for different cutoffs
Cutoff & Bunching Range Pooled data Pre-reform Post-reform
xi = 120 with δ = 1 −0.04 −0.07 0.03
(s = {123, 124}) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24)
xi = 125 with δ = 1 0.36 0.39 0.26
(s = {128, 129}) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
xi = 130 with δ = 2 0.42 0.43 0.40
(s = {133, 134, 135}) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
xi = 140 with δ = 1 −0.54 −0.55 −0.51
(s = {144, 145}) (0.15) (0.13) (0.19)
xi = 150 with δ = 1 −0.20 −0.30 0.06
(s = {154, 155}) (0.56) (0.57) (0.62)
xi = 160 with δ = 1 −0.50 −0.57 −0.35
(s = {164, 165}) (0.71) (0.72) (0.67)
Notes: The table displays the bunching estimates bˆi for the cutoffs analyzed in Figures 3.5 and 3.7 as
well as for other cutoffs. xi indicates the cutoff (in terms of penalty-relevant speed), s is the measured
speed and δ captures the width of the bunching area.
We conducted several robustness checks and refinements. The bunching estimators
for the speed cutoffs at xi = 125 and 130km/h turn out to be highly robust to using
alternative specifications (e.g., higher order polynomials) in the approximation of the
counterfactual distribution. (For ‘higher cutoffs’, this is not the case; here we do observe
much more variation in the estimated bˆi.) Splitting the sample for different hours of
the day, different weekdays or seasons, we detect no significant differences in bunching
(or stable null-results). We also split the sample according to different levels of traffic
density (approximated by the number of measured cars per hour) and differentiated
local and non-local drivers. Again, the data do not indicate any significant differences
in bunching behavior. Overall, the estimated bunching masses at x = 125 and 130km/h
seem to be very robust with respect to other observable characteristics.
In a next step, we estimated the probability of speed controls occurring at a given
time (hour, day, month) and stretch of the Autobahn. This allows us to distinguish
between ‘unlikely’ (or surprising) and ‘likely’ (or expectable) speed controls. The re-
sults indicate that bunching tends to increase in the (predicted) probability of a speed
control. Similar to the results from our other split-sample exercises, however, the
differences are modest. What is much more pronounced, however, is an overall ad-
justment in the drivers’ behavior: when speed controls are more likely to occur, we
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observe considerably fewer violations of the speed limit in the first place. The exercise
therefore suggests that the total population of drivers clearly responds to the variation
in the objective detection risk, whereas the (self-)selected sample of speeders is fairly
insensitive to the risk – potentially, because they underestimated p.
To sum up, we find evidence for bunching only at two notches of the penalty scheme.
In the light of the (i) difficulties in targeting the ‘right’ speed level (optimization
errors), (ii) imperfect knowledge about the tolerance rule and (iii) the impact from
underestimating the detection risk, the evidence provides reasonable support for the
theoretical prediction of bunching. A striking difference to the literature on tax notches,
however, is the absence of density holes. As discussed above, this might be explained
by heterogeneous beliefs about p. On the one hand, drivers who anticipate a sufficiently
high detection risk but nevertheless decide to speed might choose their optimal speed
only among different cutoffs. For these drivers, the expected notches, p∆i, would be
large and a corner solution would dominate all interior solutions. Speed levels between
two cutoffs xi and xi+1 would only be observed due to optimization errors. On the
other hand, drivers who believe that a speed control is unlikely to occur would choose
their interior optima, which are smoothly distributed all over the speed range. The
combination of drivers with heterogeneous beliefs could then produce some bunching
without having any density holes in the distribution of speeding tickets.
3.6.4 Responses to the Reform
Let us now analyze the impact of the reform. The descriptive statistics from above
revealed that, among the speeding tickets, the average speed x declined from 125.16 to
124.99km/h (see Table 3.3). These numbers, however, might be driven by differences
in the sample period, i.e., when and under which conditions the speed was measured.
To mitigate this issue, we ran a propensity score matching exercise to arrive at a
pre- and post-reform sample which is comparable regarding the time (hour of day,
weekday, month), enforcement limit, street and weather conditions. The results from
this matching exercise are presented in Table 3.5. Similar to the basic descriptives,
the results indicate that the reform is associated with a modest 0.23% decline in the
penalty-relevant speed x, from 125.36 to 125.07km/h.
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Table 3.5: Propensity score matching of pre- and post-reform speeding Levels
Sample Mean (Std. Dev.) 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile N
Pre-reform 125.33 (109.16) 119 123 129 90,486
Post-reform 125.09 (109.69) 118 122 129 32,315
Notes: The table reports the comparison of pre- and post-reform speeding levels from a propensity
matching exercise with the following confounders: time (hour of day, weekday, month), enforcement
limits, location of speed control, street and weather conditions.
It turns out, however, that Table 3.5 – which only indicates that the average speed
among speeding tickets is lower in the post-reform period – gives a misleading picture
on the impact of the reform. This point becomes obvious once we analyze the change in
the speed distribution beyond the selected sample of speeders. To do so, we computed
the share of speeding tickets with a recorded speed x above a given cutoff xi, relative
to the total number of cars (speeding and non-speeding) which were measured during
each speed control session. The results from this exercise are presented in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Fraction of speeders relative to all measured cars
Speed measure with... Pre-reform Post-reform
x > 120km/h 0.030 0.023
(0.028) (0.021)
x > 125km/h 0.019 0.014
(0.020) (0.012)
x > 130km/h 0.011 0.008
(0.013) (0.008)
x > 140km/h 0.004 0.003
(0.006) (0.003)
N (speed control sessions) 843 296
Notes: The table presents the fraction of speeding tickets with a speed x above different cutoffs from
the penalty function, relative to all (speeding and non-speeding) cars measured per speed control
session. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
The table reveals a pronounced shift in the speed distribution: relative to all drives,
the fraction of speeders with x > 120km/h – i.e., cars driving in the speed range for
which the reform increased the fines (see Table 3.1) – dropped from 3.0 to 2.3%. Con-
sidering the cutoffs xi at 125, 130 and 140km/h, we observe a similarly strong decline
of roughly 25% in the fraction of speeders who got ticketed with x > xi. While this
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pre- and post-reform comparison is sensitive to other time-varying factors beyond the
reform, the pattern from Table 3.1 is again confirmed by propensity score matching.26
Hence, the data are consistent with the prediction from Lemma 2: increasing the fines
at xi = 120km/h (and ‘higher’ cutoffs) renders speeding in this range less attractive.
We observe a pronounced shift in the speeding distribution with the fraction of speeding
tickets with x > 120km/h dropping by 23%.
In a next step we study whether bunching at cutoffs changed between the pre- and
the post-reform period. Graphical evidence suggests that bunching at the two cutoffs
xi = 125 and 130km/h is equally observed in the pre- and the post-reform sample (see
Figure 3.6 in the Appendix). To assess the changes in the speed distribution, we first
consider a simple estimation framework. We estimate the equation
Bunchingj = µ0 +
∑
`
λ`
(
Reformj × I`j
)
+
∑
`
µ` I
`
j + Xjκ+ εj, (10)
where Bunchingj is a dummy indicating whether a ticket j with speed xj falls into
the range at or slightly below a given cutoff x`, x` − δ ≤ xj ≤ x`. Reformj indicates
whether the ticket is from the post-reform period, I`j captures if a speed ticket with xj
is located around a given cutoff, x` − δ ≤ xj < x` + δ, and Xj is a vector of control
variables (including dummies for the hour, day, month, as well as street and weather
conditions during the speed measurement).
For each cutoff `, the coefficients µ` then captures the fraction of tickets (among
those in x` − δ ≤ xj < x` + δ) that are located at or slightly below x`. Hence, the
µ-coefficients will not capture bunching; they solely reflect the local slope of the (pre-
reform) distribution around each cutoff (as captured in Figure 3.6). The coefficients
of interest are the λ’s, which indicate how the fraction of tickets at or slightly below a
cutoff changed after the reform. Linear probability model (LPM) estimates of the λ’s
from equation (10) are presented in Table 3.7.27
Consistent with our theoretical prediction on the impact of the reform, we observe
an increase in the mass of tickets at or slightly below the cutoff at 120km/h. The
estimates from Table 3.7 suggest that after the reform there is a 5 percentage point
higher chance of seeing a ticket with a penalty-relevant speed just below 120km/h in the
data. While our theoretical framework does not offer any clear predictions regarding
the reform’s impact on bunching at other notches (see Section 3.4.2), it is interesting to
26Results are available from the authors upon request.
27Estimates using non-linear models, which are available from the authors upon request, yield
almost identical results.
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note that the estimates point to a decline in the frequency of tickets below the cutoffs
at 125 and 130km/h – the two cases for which we found strong and robust bunching
evidence above. There also seems to be a decline in the mass of tickets below the
cutoff at 140km/h, however, the estimate is sensitive to the precise specification and
not robust when we vary δ. For the other cutoffs, the regression analysis does not
indicate any significant impact of the reform.
Table 3.7: Impact of reform on bunching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform × I120 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.054***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Reform × I125 -0.014** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Reform × I130 -0.013** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.017** -0.027*** -0.026***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Reform × I140 -0.025* -0.038*** -0.037** -0.013 -0.024 -0.030
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Reform × I150 0.013 -0.005 -0.014 0.023 0.007 0.008
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
Reform × I160 0.062 0.036 0.007 0.066 0.045 0.021
(0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051)
Control variables: No Yesa Yesb No Yesa Yesb
N 154,970 154,970 128,644 154,970 154,970 128,644
R2 0.665 0.668 0.668 0.571 0.574 0.573
Note: The table presents the outcome from LPM estimates of equation (10). All specifications include
(non-interacted) cutoff specific dummies I`j . In columns (2) and (5), we control for the year and the
enforcement limit of the speed control session. Columns (3) and (6) add further control variables (for
the weather conditions, location, month, day of the week and hour of the day). Columns (1)–(3) are
based on δ = 2, i.e., we set I`j = 1 if x` − 2 ≤ xj < x` + 2. Columns (4)–(6) employ δ = 1 and δ = 2
and thus set I`j = 1 if x`− 1 ≤ xj < x` + 2. The bunching dummies are adjusted accordingly. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis.
To further assess the change in bunching, we also estimated the coefficient bˆi from
equation (9) for the pre- and post-reform period. The results, which are presented in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.4, capture again an increase in the mass of tickets right
at the 120km/h cutoff.28 For the 125 and 130km/h cutoffs, we observe a decline in
bunching. For the former cutoff, the estimated excess mass drops from 39 to 26%; for
the latter cutoff we estimate a more modest decline, from 43 to 40% (see Table 3.4 and
Figure 3.7 in the Appendix).
28Note that the bunching estimates use δ = 1. If we set δ = 2, as in the LPM, the bunching
estimates show a more pronounced increase in the excess mass at the 120km/h cutoff from 9 to 36%.
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To wrap up, the second part of our empirical analysis points to a non-trivial impact
of the reform in 2009, which considerably increased all notches starting with 20km/h
above the speed limit (see Table 3.1). In line with theoretical predictions, we observe
a 25% drop in the fraction of drivers speeding with 120km/h or above. At the same
time, the fraction of speeding tickets slightly below the 120km/h cutoff increases in the
post-reform period. Consistent with this pronounced shift in the speed distribution,
aggregated accident statistics indicate a positive impact of the reform, too. Comparing
the first six months after the reform with the same months in the pre-reform year, the
total number of accidents as well as the rate of deadly accidents both declined by 3
percent.29
3.7 Concluding Discussion
This paper has studied drivers’ knowledge of and responses to a notched penalty scheme
for speeders in Germany. We first ran an online survey which provided evidence sug-
gesting that most drivers have a very good knowledge of the scheme’s stepwise shape
with its discontinuous jumps in penalties at certain speed cutoffs. Exploiting micro-
data from more than 150,000 speeding tickets from the German Autobahn, we then
studied whether drivers bunch at speed levels slightly below these cutoffs. Consistent
with our theoretical analysis, we observe significant bunching at two prominent notches
of the scheme. For the notches at very high speed levels (with 40, 50 or 60km/h above
the limit of 100km/h), however, there is no bunching. The latter observation is con-
sistent with the interpretation that excessive speeders might have underestimated the
risk of a speed control.
This point also highlights one major difference between our analysis and the bunch-
ing studies in the taxation literature. In our context, agents respond to expected notches
which are jointly shaped by two policy parameters: the (shape of the) penalty function
and the detection risk. With heterogeneous priors about the latter risk, for which we
find several pieces of evidence, one cannot directly translate the bunching mass from
these notches into a straightforward measure of behavioral elasticities. Hence, the
evidence simply shows that (some) drivers rationally respond to the notched penalty
scheme.
29Own computations based on data obtained from Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt (Fachserie
8/7, Verkehr). Similar pre-post differences are obtained if one controls for month specific effects using
de-trended monthly data.
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In line with rational responses, our analysis also documents a significant change in
the speed distribution after a reform of the penalty scheme. After the reform, which
increased all fines for speeding 20km/h above the limit, we observe a 25% drop of
drivers speeding in this range. At the same time, there is an increase in tickets with a
speed slightly below the 20km/h cutoff.
From a normative perspective, these findings have several interesting implications.
In principle, one might argue that a notched penalty scheme might be inferior as it is
only a rough approximation to a Pigouvian correction mechanism. A ‘true’ Pigouvian
mechanism would account for the fact that marginal externalities from speeding (acci-
dent risk, air and noise pollution, etc.) are continuously increasing in the speed level.
When agents are imperfectly informed or boundedly rational, however, the simplicity
of the stepwise scheme might increase awareness and contributes to the good knowl-
edge of the penalty system – a point which is consistent with our survey evidence. The
notched system could therefore dominate a more complex, Pigouvian penalty function.
A further point that speaks in favor of the notched system directly follows from our
bunching evidence: the fact that many drivers speed at similar speed levels tends to
reduce the variance in speed. As suggested in Lave (1985), this could in turn contribute
to a reduction in the accident risk. Ultimately, a credible and comprehensive welfare
assessment which considers all these pros and cons requires exogenous variation be-
tween continuous and notched penalty schemes. Given the ubiquitousness of notches
in law enforcement, seeking for such a quasi-experiment appears to be a promising
direction for future research.
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Appendix
3.A1. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The result that the set of types of drivers that bunch at a
certain notch xi must be an interval [θi, θi] is an immediate implication of the single
crossing property: Let θi := inf{θ : xi ∈ arg maxEU(x; θ)} and θi := sup{θ : xi ∈
arg maxEU(x; θ)}, and consider some θ ∈ [θi, θi]. For all x < xi, [v(xi, θ) − pf(xi)] −
[v(x, θ) − pf(x)] > [v(xi, θi) − pf(xi)] − [v(x, θi) − pf(x)] ≥ 0, and for all x > xi,
[v(x, θ) − pf(x)] − [v(xi, θ) − pf(xi)] < [v(x, θi) − pf(x)] − [v(xi, θi) − pf(xi)] ≤ 0.
Hence, all θ ∈ [θi, θi) strictly prefer xi over any other speed level.
Let us now turn to characterizing the boundaries of that interval. As discussed
in the main text, Figure 3.3 illustrates the case where θi fulfills (4). Alternatively,
however, xi may be a corner solution for type θi, i.e. x
∗(θi) > xi. In this case, (5)
claims that type θi is indifferent between xi and some other cutoff xj, j < i. To
prove this claim, suppose that type θi strictly preferred xi over any xj, j < i. By
continuity, there must be some type θ′ < θi that also strictly prefers xi over any xj,
j < i and for which x∗(θ′) > xi, which implies that θ′ strictly prefers xi over any x < xi.
Furthermore, by the single crossing property, [v(xi, θ
′)− pf(xi)]− [v(x, θ′)− pf(x)] >
[v(xi, θi)−pf(xi)]− [v(x, θi)−pf(x)] ≥ 0 for all x > xi. Hence, arg maxEU(x; θ′) = xi,
a contradiction to the definition of θi.
As for the upper boundary θi, recall first that all θ < θi strictly prefer xi over
all x > xi. Furthermore, for every θ > θi, there exists an x > xi which this type θ
strictly prefers over xi. Hence, by continuity, there must be some xˆ > xi such that
v(xˆ, θi)−v(xi, θi) = p(fj−fi), where fj is the relevant fine for speed xˆ, i.e. xj−1 < xˆ ≤ xj
and j > i. As xˆ ∈ arg maxEU(x; θi), we have either xˆ = x∗(θi) < xj, in which case
(6) is satisfied, or xˆ = xj, in which case (7) holds.
Proof of Lemma 2. For every θ and every x, x′ ≤ x` or x, x′ > x`, EU(x; θ) −
EU(x′; θ) is not changed by the reform. However, the reform reduces EU(x; θ) −
EU(x′; θ) for every x′ ≤ x` < x and every θ. Hence, if the reform induces any change
in behavior, it can only be that drivers who drive at some speed x > x` before the
reform, choose a speed x ≤ x` after the reform.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us first discuss the impacts of changing ∆` on the θi
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and θi of some cutoff xi. Consider the effect on θi and suppose that θi is determined
by condition (4). This equation is independent of f`, which implies that θi remains
unchanged. Suppose now that θi is determined by condition (5). Taking the total
differentials w.r.t. θi and the difference fi − fj yields
dθi
d(fi − fj) =
p
∂v(xi,θi)
∂θ
− ∂v(xj ,θi)
∂θ
> 0 (11)
due to the single-crossing property. An increase in ∆` has, ceteris paribus, an effect on
the difference fi − fj if and only if j ≤ ` < i. Furthermore, if it has any effect, then
such an increase in ∆` will increase this difference fi − fj, thus increasing θi.
As for θi, suppose first that it is determined by (6). Taking the total differentials
w.r.t. θi and the difference fj − fi yields
dθi
d(fj − fi) =
p
∂v(x∗(θi),θi)
∂θ
− ∂v(xi,θi)
∂θ
> 0 (12)
due to the single-crossing property. Suppose now that θi is determined by (7). Taking
the total differentials w.r.t. θi and the difference fj − fi yields
dθi
d(fj − fi) =
p
∂v(xj ,θi)
∂θ
− ∂v(xi,θi)
∂θ
> 0 (13)
again due to the single-crossing property. An increase in ∆` has, ceteris paribus, an
effect on the difference fj−fi if and only if i ≤ ` < j. Furthermore, if it has any effect,
then such an increase in ∆` will increase this difference fλ − fi, thus increasing θi.
Using these results, we can complete the proofs:
Part (i): If i > `, an increase in ∆` has, ceteris paribus, no effect on θi and may
sometimes increase θi. Hence, such an increase in ∆j weakly reduces Πi.
Part (ii): If i ≤ `, an increase in ∆` has, ceteris paribus, no effect on θi and may
sometimes increase θi. Hence, such an increase in ∆j weakly increases Πi.
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3.A2. Complementary Figures
Figure 3.6: Pre- and post-reform distribution of penalty-relevant speeding levels
Note: The figure illustrates the distribution of penalty-relevant speeding levels among speeding tickets
from the pre- and post-reform period. The horizontal axis indicates the speed above the limit. The
vertical axis indicates the percentage share of observations for each speed level. The green dashed
vertical lines indicate the cutoffs at the respective speed levels. The number of observations for
pre-reform [post-reform] period is 89,520 [34,356] in the displayed speed range.
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Figure 3.7: Empirical and counterfactual distribution of speeding levels: Pre- and
post-reform period
Note: The two panels on the left display the empirical and counterfactual distribution of measured
speed for the pre-period. The panels on the right show the distributions for the post-reform period.
The top panels compares the distribution around the cutoff xi = 125 (corresponding to a measured
speed s = 129km/h), the panels at the bottom consider the cutoff xi = 130 (corresponding to
s = 135km/h). The horizontal axes indicate the measured speed s. The vertical axes show the
share of observations for each speed level in percent. The blue line captures the empirical distribution
and the red curve shows the estimated counterfactual distribution. The counterfactual in the top
[bottom] panels are estimated with a linear [quadratic] slope. The dashed vertical lines indicate the
cutoffs in terms of measured speed s.
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Supplementary Appendix
3.B. Online Survey: Complementary Material
3.B1. Main Survey Questions
1. Consequences of Speeding
In four sequential questions, participants are confronted with four different lev-
els of speed, Xj, which are randomly and independently drawn from X1 ∈
{19, 20, 21}, X2 ∈ {24, 25, 26}, X3 ∈ {29, 30, 31}, X4 ∈ {34, 39}.
Imagine you are notified about a speeding fine for a violation of the speed limit on
a motorway. What is your estimate of the speeding fine for exceeding the speed
limit by Xj kilometers per hour? (Indicate the monetary fine in Euro; response
in integer values.)
2. Penalty Increases
At which values, if any at all, do the penalties for speeding increase? For example,
select 19 km/h when you think the penalty for driving 19 km/h above the limit
is greater than for a speed of 18 km/h above the limit. (Please select only one of
the response options per line.)
19 km/h... 20 km/h... 21 km/h over limit none of these values
24 km/h... 25 km/h... 26 km/h over limit none of these values
29 km/h... 30 km/h... 31 km/h over limit none of these values
39 km/h... 40 km/h... 41 km/h over limit none of these values
49 km/h... 50 km/h... 51 km/h over limit none of these values
3. Avoiding a penalty
In case of speeding, do you try to avoid higher penalties by staying under a
certain threshold?
Yes / More likely Yes / More likely No / No / I never speed
4. Relevant Speed for determining Penalty (1)
Do you know the official deduction rule (Toleranzabzug Regel) for computing the
speed level which is then relevant for determining the penalties?
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Yes / Not exactly / No
5. Relevant Speed for determining Penalty (2)
Subjects who answered the previous question with ‘No’ skipped this one.
By how many percent does the official deduction rule subtract from the measured
speed?
By 0% / 1% / ... / 9% / 10% (11 options)
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3.B2. Complementary Survey Evidence
Figure 3.8: Expectations regarding the cutoff points
Notes: For each of the five cutoffs (21, 26, 31, 41 and 51km/h above the speed limit), the bar graphs
represent the fraction of respondents who expect an increase in the penalties at one (or none) of the
indicated speed levels. (See survey question 2 from Online Survey, above.)
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Figure 3.9: Expected tolerance rule deductions (in percent)
Notes: The bar graph represents the fraction of respondents who expect the tolerance rule to deduct
0, 1, ..., 10 percent of the measured speed. (See survey question 5 from Online Appendix, above.)
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